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Using an Educational Module and Simulation Learning Experience to Improve Medication
Safety
Abstract
The purpose of this evidence-based change in practice project was to provide nurses with an
experiential learning opportunity, using simulation, to identify and report near miss events during
the medication administration process related to patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) usage.
Despite extensive in-service training on a Medical/Surgical (Med/Surg) floor in an acute care
hospital, inconsistent, inaccurate and incomplete documentation with use of the new PCA pumps
continued to be problematic. A conceptual framework of just culture was used with the quality
improvement method of the Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycle for testing change. Medication
safety education was a valid andragogical strategy to decrease rates of medication errors and
improve patient outcomes by identifying complex system issues that interfered with safe
practices. The education program consisted of a series of self-learning modules, definitions of
near miss events and medication errors; in addition a simulation learning experience was
included. A needs assessment was conducted to help determine gaps in practice. Results of the
survey demonstrated inconsistencies in the current practice of documenting vital signs on
patients with a PCA in contrast to the existing policy and procedure; these results were shared
with the staff nurses at a staff meeting and via email. Although no changes in care delivery were
directly observed, the doctorate of nursing practice (DNP) student was able to reinforce the
documentation requirements per the hospital’s policy.
Key words: medication safety, medication errors, near miss events, medication safety
education, simulation, patient-controlled analgesia, quality improvement
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Section II: Introduction

Background knowledge:
The setting consists of a small (172-bed) county hospital, which is also a teaching
hospital. The organization espouses innovation, compassion, and dedication to high quality,
patient-centered health care according to their mission and vision statements. Improving quality
outcomes and increasing patient satisfaction are a few of the stated goals on the hospital’s web
page. However, being a government run organization, the hospital can be described as
bureaucratic in terms of the organizational structure and complex processes that slows down the
completion of an otherwise simple task. For example, the activity of signing a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) for a doctoral student to complete an evidence-based change in practice
project took approximately six months to get the necessary paperwork signed and processed.
In January 2014, the hospital was selected to become the region’s designated Level II
trauma center. As a result, the staff nurses received many hours of education related to caring for
trauma patients as the implementation plan moves forward. Unfortunately, the needed education
to prepare for the trauma designation proved to be a significant obstacle in the implementation of
this evidence-based change in practice project. To further complicate any attempts to sustain
planned change, there has been significant turnover within the administration. For example, over
the past 18 months, three different Chief Nursing Officers (CNOs) have occupied the position. In
addition, the current Chief Executive Officer (CEO) unexpectedly resigned in July 2014,
resulting in an interim appointment to fill the position.
There has been a long-standing history of resistance to change within the organization.
The nursing staff does not readily embrace change and are difficult to motivate to take
responsibility for quality patient care. For example, when the responsibility for obtaining a
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second set of vital signs on the shift was transferred to the primary nurse, there was resistance
and objections to the extra duties the nurse was required to complete on their shift. There is a
perception of a top-down process in which the nurses are being told to how to do their jobs and
being made to comply. As such, a culture of safety is not consistently demonstrated based on
anecdotal comments from the nursing staff and their supervisors; for example, the pharmacy
director removed privileges from several nurses who were not documenting accurately regarding
the use of patient-controlled analgesic (PCA) pumps instead of trying to determine the root of the
problem.
There is one nursing director who oversees the medical/surgical (Med/Surg) unit,
intensive care unit (ICU), acute rehabilitation unit (ARU), and Dialysis unit. The director’s span
of control is comprised of approximately 120 full-time equivalent (FTEs) employees and stated
that it was difficult to find the time to be the role model the Med/Surg unit needed. The nursing
director also stated experiencing incivility by her coworkers through sabotage, indifference and
lack of collaboration.
The care problem was broad in terms of improving medication safety. After meeting with
the directors of Education, Pharmacy, and Quality, there were two specific issues identified; the
first issue was that nurses were not reporting enough near miss events and secondly, there were
persistent issues with PCA documentation despite extensive education when the new PCA
pumps were implemented. The hospital uses the standardized definition of a medication error
according to the National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention
(NCC MERP, 2014):
"A medication error is any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate
medication use or patient harm while the medication is in the control of the health care
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professional, patient, or consumer. Such events may be related to professional practice,
health care products, procedures, and systems, including prescribing; order
communication; product labeling, packaging, and nomenclature; compounding;
dispensing; distribution; administration; education; monitoring; and use." (About
medication errors section, para. 1).
Local Problem:
The true severity of the problem was difficult to quantify because of frequent changes in
reporting processes. Traditionally, Quality Review Reports (QRRs) were collected from
anonymous reporting through a dedicated phone line or the traditional handwritten method using
established paper forms. From these reports, data were collected and transcribed to an excel
spreadsheet that summarized the event date and description for tracking and reporting purposes.
The hospital also used an external vendor (BETA Healthcare Group) to trial a program to
measure the stability of medication incident rates from January 2010 until June 2012. This
system reported the number of incidents per adjusted census units and the categories of incidents.
A new process began in February 2014 that consisted of on-line reporting using the Quality
Management/Risk Module in Meditech. These new reports were more detailed and provided
information based on the number of patient days, number of medication incidents per location,
total number of QRRs (all types), and total number of QRRs specific to medication incidents.
Furthermore, both near miss occurrences and medication errors were categorized as medication
events. It is possible that near misses were incorrectly categorized as errors or went completely
unreported. Please see table one, for an overview of the medication events.
Old reporting system
Census (monthly)
Incidents (average medication incidents per month)

2010
318
20.5

2011
321
18.5

6 months
2012
318
47.7

MEDICATION SAFETY

New reporting system
FY2011 FY2012 FY 2013
Number of patient days
No data No data 39,344
Total # QRRs (all types)
No data No data 1665
Average QRR rate per 1000 patient days
No data No data 42.3
(all types)
Average QRRs/day (all types)
No data No data 4.56
% of QRRs specifically related to medication
36%
events
n=210
n=411
n=604
Average medication related QRRs/1000 patient
No data No data 15.35
days
% of medication QRRs per location: ICU and
No data No data 19%
Med/Surg
n=115
% of medication QRRs per location: Med/Surg
No data No data No data
(only)
FY=Fiscal year (July-June); QRRs=Quality Review Reports; ICU-Intensive Care Unit;
Med/Surg=Medical/Surgical Unit
Table 1: Medication Incident Rates
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FY 2014
38,822
1912
49.25
5.24
22%
n=437
11.26
23.1%
n=101
13.5%
n=59

A review of the QRRs related to medication events from the 2012-2013 fiscal year
demonstrated several issues. Examples of systems factors affecting safe medication
administration in this small acute care hospital include lack of pharmacy driven protocols (i.e.
Heparin), patient-controlled analgesic pumps that do not have the most frequently used opioid
analgesics programmed (i.e. Fentanyl), and intravenous (IV) infusion pumps have out dated drug
libraries programmed with ineffective safety guardrails. With the current IV pumps there is no
efficient way to program new drugs; updates consist of a very labor-intensive process because of
a lack of wireless integration.
From a human perspective, a survey conducted in summer of 2013 by the hospital
examined staff perceptions of patient safety and error reporting; results indicated 88% of staff
perceived that patients are provided safe care and 75% of staff perceive error-reporting is nonpunitive. Although staff perceptions are high, room for improvement existed in order to
determine the extent of awareness of the variety of factors surrounding medication errors. Lastly,
according to the last Medication Error Reduction Plan (MERP) results, the hospital was found to
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have deficiencies in reporting near miss events, making the current situation unacceptable. The
literature describes under reporting near miss events and medication errors as a pervasive issue;
this hospital is no different with the challenges experienced with medication event reporting.
In September 2013, the hospital changed the infusion pumps being used for patientcontrolled analgesia delivery to increase patient safety by monitoring end-tidal carbon dioxide
(ETCO2) concentrations. The pharmacy director reported improper documentation and
incomplete assessment practices as persistent problems with both the old and new PCA devices.
There are 400 nurses employed at the hospital with approximately 200 nurses having completed
an orientation checklist verifying their understanding of the use and management of the new
PCA pump. Not all nurses were required to complete the training because of service area and
infrequency in caring for patients with PCAs. Primarily nurses from Med/Surg and Labor and
Delivery care for the most patients on PCA pumps.
Electronic health record (EHR) audits revealed inadequate or incomplete documentation
for vital signs, patient assessment, and amount of drug administered. Specifically, according to
the pharmacy director, one third of the nursing staff who received the educational in-service
were not documenting correctly and an absence of a second independent verification had been
noted. However, further details regarding the scope of the problem was not differentiated per
nursing unit. In general, these practices posed a huge liability for the hospital by increasing the
risk for medication errors and impacting patient safety.
Purpose of Change:
Over the course of this project, the purpose has evolved as a result of many obstacles.
Initially, the purpose of the project was medication safety in terms of increasing the nurses’
awareness of factors often associated with medication errors. The second focus became evident

9

MEDICATION SAFETY

10

in response to the question “What is the best method to measure increased awareness of
medication safety?” when planning the evaluation of the project. The decision at that time was to
focus on QRRs by educating nurses on how to report near miss events in order to become
compliant with outside regulatory agencies (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
State of California Department of Health Care Services, and The Joint Commission (TJC)).
Lastly, concerns were expressed from the directors of pharmacy, quality management and
education related to continued issues with the use and management of PCA pumps, including
non-compliance with the established interdisciplinary policy and procedure and incomplete
documentation. Both pharmacy and quality management departments were tracking the problems
and working collaboratively to develop a resolution. In an effort to improve patient safety, new
PCAs pumps with ETCO2 monitoring were purchased and implemented in September 2013.
Nurses received a two-hour educational in-service provided by the vendor with an additional
one-hour hands on opportunity with a “super-user” to review pump programming, the PCA
policy, and practice documentation in the EHR. Despite this method of education, issues with
documentation and adherence to the policy persisted.
According to the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), it is reasonable to
implement small tests of change to determine how effectively the planned change will lead to the
desired improvements, which combination of changes will produce sustainable results, and to
evaluate costs, social impact and side effects from a proposed change (IHI, 2014). Essentially,
this test of change was measuring the impact of multiple, different educational modalities on
changing behavior. A traditional PowerPoint (PPT) was converted into a HealthStream© (a
learning management system) course and used to educate nurses on medication safety concepts
(developed by a DNP student). A second PPT was used to introduce the new online QRR
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reporting system (developed by the hospital’s quality department). Several educational
techniques were used to increase compliance with PCA documentation: just in time training
while observing nurses when PCAs were in use, face-to-face interviews to gain insight regarding
current practice and system obstacles, using an online survey to complete a needs assessment,
and a developing a simulation experience involving PCA care and management.
Based on the needs of the organization, there were two AIM statements for this project.
The first AIM statement was, “By September 31, 2014, the nursing staff on the Med/Surg unit
will increase the number of near miss reports using the new QRR module by 10%”. The second
AIM statement was, “By September 31, 2014, the nursing staff on the Med/Surg unit will
achieve greater than 50% compliance with documentation of narcotic volumes and dosages given
on the PCA Change/Co-signature required screen in the EHR”.
Review of the Evidence:
Both CINAHL and Proquest databases were searched using key terms such as factors
contributing to medication errors, human factors, system factors, human error, medication safety,
medication education, costs of medication errors, medication error rates, and near miss error
rates. Articles were reviewed to determine the scope of the problem, educational interventions,
and costs of medication errors. The Johns Hopkins Nursing Evidence Based Practice (JHNEBP)
Research Evidence Appraisal tool was used to determine the strength of the evidence, study
results and conclusions. The majority of the research articles were rated as Level III because
most were non-experimental studies and the majority of the non-research articles were literature
reviews (Level 5); the quality ratings for the scientific evidence were rated as predominately
good quality. See Appendix Q for the complete review of articles about medication safety
programs, scope of the problem and contributing factors and the cost of medication errors.

MEDICATION SAFETY

12

Administration of medications in a hospital setting is a daily occurrence; every nurse
administers an average of 10 medication doses for every patient, every day (Aspden, Wolcoctt,
Bootman & Cronenwett, 2007). The act of giving a medication is not a simple task; in fact the
process is fraught with complexities. Medication administration errors occur at alarming rates in
hospitals. The human and financial costs of these errors are astronomical; estimated direct costs
are approximately $21 billion, indirect costs exceed $75 billion and account for approximately
7000 lives lost annually (Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Kohn, Corrigan, Donaldson,
2000; New England Health Institute (NEHI), 2011). There are many factors derived from human
and system sources, contributing to these startling statistics.
Exact numbers of medication errors are difficult to obtain because not all medication
errors are detected and not all detected errors are reported (Dennison, 2007; Hughes & Blegen,
2008). The committee on Identifying and Preventing Medication Errors reports at least 1.5
million preventable medication errors and adverse drug events (ADEs) occur each year in the
United States, excluding errors of omission (Aspden, et al., 2007). It is estimated that on average,
the hospitalized patient will be exposed to a minimum of one medication error each day they are
hospitalized (Aspden, et al., 2007) due to the volume of occurrences. It is estimated that for
every detected medication error, there are approximately 100 errors that go undetected daily as a
result of the sheer volume of medications being prescribed, dispensed, and administered in the
hospital (NEHI, 2011). Wahr et al. (2013) conducted a retrospective cross-sectional study (Level
3) and found the severity of harm for patients experiencing a medication error is low; greater
than 90% of all medication errors result is no or low harm, with only 10% contributing to serious
patient harm. After conducting a non-experimental, retrospective analysis (Level 3) of
medication errors, Pinella, Murillo, Carrasco, and Humet, (2006), found that 36% of errors
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resulted in slightly increased monitoring, 31% of errors did not result in patient harm, and 26%
of the errors did not actually reach the patient. This means that the safety systems that have been
implemented are moderately working to catch and prevent serious harm or death.
Unfortunately, nurses are often not aware that a medication error or near miss event has
occurred (Choo, et al., 2010) or what constitutes a medication error (Dennison, 2007). Without
clear definitions, the degree of underreported medication errors cannot be fully recognized, thus
contributing to the inability to change key aspects of the complex medication delivery system
(Harding & Petrick, 2008). The number of medication administration errors is underestimated
and generally under-reported by an estimated 90% (McDermott, 2013). In a seminal
ethnomethodological study, Baker (1997) identified six ways nurses categorize medication
errors: it is not a medication error if a) it is not my fault; b) everyone knows; c) you can put it
right; d) a patient has needs that are more urgent than the accurate administration of medication;
e) it is a clerical error; and f) the irregularity prevents something worse. Baker determined that if
an error occurred that could not be ascribed to one of these six categories, then it was considered
a real medication error; at which time, the nurse’s highest priority was to protect the patient.
These conditions offer a deep insight into why errors are underreported.
There is an existing culture of fear and blame associated with the stigma and
ramifications of reporting medication errors; approximately 50% of nurses are reticent about
reporting medication errors because they fear disciplinary action and often don’t report them
(Brady, Malone & Fleming, 2009; Dennison, 2007). Additional explanations for under-reporting
include an unawareness that a medication error has occurred, unfamiliarity with reporting
processes when a medication error does occur, fear of legal ramifications, and fear of being
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perceived as incompetent (Brady, Malone & Fleming, 2009; Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall,
2010; Dennison, 2007; Harding & Petrick, 2008).
There is a stigma attributed to making an error, and perceived repercussions if the error is
negatively reflected in the nurse’s performance evaluation. An AHRQ survey found that 56% of
nurses thought mistakes are held against them and occurrences were recorded in personnel files
(AHRQ, 2012). Choo, Hutchinson, and Bucknall (2010) recommend a simplified process for
reporting medication errors and emphasized the need for developing a culture of safety by not
punishing those who do report these errors. Brady, Malone, and Fleming (2009) suggest
developing a clear definition of what a medication error is in order to increase the accuracy of
reporting. Dennison (2007) recognized that leadership has a crucial role in creating practice
change using a culture of safety; continuing to blame the individual or expect error-free
performance is not realistic. A culture of safety will augment the reporting process of medication
errors and reduce the likelihood that the same type of error will reoccur (Harding & Petrick,
2008; Wolf, Hicks & Serembus, 2006). Benner et al. (2002) identified a concept known as
practice responsibility; which refers to individual accountability and experiential learning that is
shared with others to collectively change practice by creating a safer patient care environment.
The traditional approach to medication administration includes the five rights as the
standard and foundation by which nurses are taught; however, these five rights do not reflect the
fundamental intricacies associated with the process of administering medications in a hospital
setting (Choo, et al, 2010; Harding & Petrick, 2008). There is a strong consensus that the five
rights consists of the right patient, drug, dose, route, and time; additional rights have been added
to include right reason (Benner, et al., 2002; Harding & Petrick), and documentation (Harding &
Petrick).
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According to the California Health and Safety Code §1339.63, the legal definition of a
medication-related error refers to any preventable medication-related event that adversely affects
a patient in general acute care hospitals, and “that is related to professional practice, or health
care products, procedures, and systems, including, but not limited to, prescribing, prescription
order communications, product labeling, packaging and nomenclature, compounding,
dispensing, distribution, administration, education, monitoring, and use” (2011, para. 5). As
mentioned previously, the hospital uses the standardized definition of a medication error
according to the National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention
(NCC MERP).
The process of medication delivery includes several components: prescribing, dispensing,
administration, and evaluation. Nurses are directly and consistently involved in the
administration phase of medication delivery and thus are well positioned to prevent medication
errors from reaching the patient (Harding & Petrick, 2008; Kazaoka, Ohtsuka, Ueno, & Mori,
2007; Page & McKinney, 2007). Despite numerous definitions, a medication error can simply be
defined as an actual or potential event, which may be preventable, and can lead to patient harm
(Aspden, Wolcott, Bootman & Cronenwett, 2007; Choo, Hutchinson & Bucknall, 2010;
Dennison, 2007; Fowler, Sohler, & Zarillo, 2009; Harding & Petrick, 2008; Taneja &
Wiegmann, 2004; Wolf, Hicks, & Serembus, 2006). Making an error in the preparation of
medication for a patient, by intercepting or recognizing the error before it reaches the patient is
an example of a near miss event (Choo, Hutchinson & Bucknall, 2010; ISMP, 2009; Koohestani
& Baghcheghi, 2009; Reid-Searl, Moxhan, & Happell, 2010). Wolf and Hughes (2008) report
the magnitude and consequence of under reporting near miss events; near miss events can occur
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300 times more frequently than adverse events and if reported, provide rich evidence to
proactively reduce errors.
During medication administration, human errors can be attributed to the complex, multistep system processes that are established in the hospital (Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010;
Clancy, Effken, & Pesut, 2008; Harding & Petrick, 2008). Common human characteristics
contributing to medication error include:
1. Problems with communication between health care providers were frequently
cited as a contributing factor for medication errors (Benner, et al., 2002; Brady,
Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Hughes, &
Blegen, 2008; Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014; Reid-Searl, Moxham, &
Happell, 2010; Saintsing, Gibson, & Pennington, 2011).
2. Problem with doctor’s orders consisted of illegible handwriting, incomplete
orders, and use of inappropriate or unapproved abbreviations (Benner, et al.,
2002; Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014;
Saintsing, Gibson, & Pennington, 2011).
3. The experience of the nurse was a factor in avoiding medication errors; lack of
experience was a likely contributing factor to explain deviations from policies,
procedures, and protocol that resulted in a medication error (Brady, Malone, &
Fleming, 2009; Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Hughes & Blegen, 2008;
Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014; Reid-Searl, Moxham, & Happell, 2010;
Saintsing, Gibson, & Pennington, 2011; Wolf, Hicks, & Serembus, 2006).
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4. Lack of knowledge related to pharmacology and math calculation skills was
linked to more medication errors (Brady, Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Hughes, &
Blegen, 2008; Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014; Kiekkas, et al., 2011).
5. Poor understanding of the equipment, such as IV infusion pumps, added to
problem of medication errors (Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014; Saintsing,
Gibson, & Pennington, 2011).
6. Process issues such as distractions, interruptions that affect the provider’s ability
to focus on the task of administering medications; examples include events on the
unit, patient needs, or demands from coworkers (Benner, et al., 2002; Brady,
Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Hughes, &
Blegen, 2008; Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014; Wolf, Hicks, & Serembus,
2006).
7. Personal neglect is described as multi-tasking or by preparing medication in
advance (Brady, Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis,
2014).
8. Multiple demands or stress of the work environment and the complexity of
patients or physician prescriptions contributed to medication errors (Choo,
Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Hughes, & Blegen, 2008; Kiekkas, et al., 2011;
Saintsing, Gibson, & Pennington, 2011).
Common system characteristics contributing to medication error include:
1. Environmental factors such as poor lighting, noise levels, and equipment failure
all contribute the increased incidence of medication errors (Benner, et al., 2002;
Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010).
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2. Medication related topics such look alike-sound alike (LASA) medications;
similar packaging and labels for medications impact the accuracy of medication
administration (Brady, Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Benner, et al., 2002; ISMP,
2007; Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014).
3. Inadequate orientation about the policies and procedures for medication
administration or insufficient training with the medication delivery system or
barcoding/scanning technology (Benner, et al., 2002; Choo, Hutchinson, &
Bucknall, 2010).
4. Nurse staffing, skill mix, shift length, heavy workload, high patient/nurse ratios,
lack of staff or presence of new staff nurses produces an unsafe environment
within which the nurse works (Brady, Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Choo,
Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Hughes & Blegen, 2008; Karavasiliadou &
Athanasakis, 2014; Kiekkas, et al., 2011; Saintsing, Gibson, & Pennington, 2011).
5. Technology, lack of clinical decision support features, equipment failures (Brady,
Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Hughes & Blegen, 2008).
Opioid errors are one of the top three medication safety issues for 2014 because of
inadequate assessment and monitoring (Erickson, 2014). Intravenous (IV) meds are more
dangerous when administering incorrectly because they result in more serious complications
(Dennison, 2007; Westbrook, Rob, Woods, & Parry, 2011). The probability of at least one error
was 73%, and when the medication was administered via IV bolus, the chance of error and harm
were four times more likely (p<0.001) (Westbrook, Rob, Woods, & Parry, 2011). There are 20
IV drugs that are responsible for 80% of all errors (Dennison, 2007). In a retrospective, crosssectional study, opiates, antibacterials and anticoagulants were the top three classes most
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frequently involved in medication error across the United States and the United Kingdom (Whar,
et al., 2013).
Conceptual Framework:
Healthcare has typically had a punitive approach to errors (Barnsteiner & Disch, 2012;
Dennison, 2007; Leape, 1994; Marx, 2007; Reason, 2000). To help provide psychological safety
and reduce the threat of talking about medication errors, a just culture environment is essential.
Barnsteiner and Disch (2012) describe a just culture as one that is transparent, without fear of
retribution if a medication error is made and rewards people who report safety-related
information so that efforts can be directed towards improving and fixing the system.
According to Berwick and Leape, “if we truly want safer care we will have to design
safer care systems” (1999, p. 136). Reason (2000) echoes this statement writing, “we cannot
change the human condition, but we can change the conditions under which humans work” (p.
769). Emphasis on ‘what’ went wrong, not ‘who’ is at fault is critical (Barnsteiner & Disch,
2012). The underpinnings of just culture is about creating and supporting a learning culture, one
that is open and fair, and centered on designing safer systems and managing behavioral choices
(Marx, 2007). Decades ago, Leape (1994) recognized the paradox that exists in healthcare: the
standard of practice in medicine and nursing is perfection, however healthcare professionals
acknowledge that mistakes are inevitable and most want to learn from the mistakes in an
understanding and supportive environment.
Marx (2007) describes three behaviors that contribute to error. The first behavior is a
genuine human error or mistake as a result of an unintentional lapse or slip in judgment. This
type of error is managed through changes in processes, procedures, or training with the intention
of consoling or supporting the person who made the mistake. The second behavior is at-risk
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behavior; this is most frequent and most dangerous behavior! The health care provider makes an
intentional and conscious choice to engage in the risk behavior because they may believe the risk
to be justified or may not even recognize the potential for risk. When health care providers
continually engage in at-risk behavior, they drift from following policies and procedure and best
practices by developing work-arounds because of time constraints and fluctuating patient needs.
This behavior is generally managed through removing incentives for at-risk behaviors, creating
incentive for health behaviors and increasing situational awareness. The last behavior is reckless
behavior in which there is a conscious disregard of rules/processes or an acceptance of an
unreasonable amount of risk. This behavior is managed through remedial or punitive action.
Unless there is a pattern of making medication errors or evidence of reckless behavior, one event
should not warrant disciplinary action or termination.
It is unrealistic to expect error-free performance. Reason (2000) describes active failures
as unsafe acts involving clinicians who are in direct contact with the patient or the system. These
active failures can be compared to Marx’s description of human error in that they involve lapses,
mistakes, or unintentional procedural violations. Complex system processes produce latent
failures (Reason, 2000). These latent conditions are embedded within the organization and
waiting for the right opportunity (in the presence of an active failure) to present itself. Reason
(2000) uses a Swiss cheese model to demonstrate how an error can occur despite having system
defenses and safeguards in place to prevent them. Each slice of Swiss cheese represents a level
of protection; however gaps still exist, and when these gaps line up, an error can occur. Benner et
al. (2002) identified a concept known as practice responsibility, which refers to individual
accountability and experiential learning that is shared with others to collectively change practice
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by creating a safer patient care environment. It is important for nurses to learn from not only
their own mistakes, but also from the mistakes of others.
For an evidence-based change in practice project, the Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycle
is an appropriate quality improvement method for testing a change. The idea of implementing
small tests of change to see what “sticks” is used for action-oriented learning (IHI, 2014). The
first step of the cycle is planning the test of change (in this case, education) and determining the
methods for collecting data. The second step involves trying out the test on a small scale; for this
project, the Med/Surg unit was selected, rather than implementing the project throughout the
entire hospital. Step three involves studying the data and analyzing the results of the education
module. The final step is the refine the change, based on the previous results, in order to plan the
next test of change.
Errors, near misses and adverse drug events (ADEs) must all be reported voluntarily and
anonymously. Hospital administration will need to adopt a culture of safety to improve the
reporting of actual and near miss events (Dennison, 2007). A top down approach is preferred
because higher quality nursing practices are associated with practice environments are supported
by administration (Flynn, Liang, Dickson, Xie, & Suh, 2012). Hospitals should be preoccupied
with failure and build defenses to avert errors (Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Reason,
2000). Furthermore, Andel et al., (2012) reported a correlation between how a hospital is
designed to improve quality of care and patient outcomes. Since errors are comprised of human
and system factors, hospital administration must also be accountable for faulty systems and
organizational processes. A just culture environment is also necessary to help provide
psychological safety and reduce the threat of talking about medication errors. When nurses feel
safe, they will be more likely to report errors and near miss events. Once systems issues and
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processes are identified, administration has a responsibility to commit resources and personnel to
build safer systems in order to improve the quality and safety of patient care.
Furthermore, education on quality and safety in nursing, the quality improvement
process, definitions of a near miss event and medication error and how to report them is needed.
Nurses should know how to perform a root cause analysis. Basic investigation skills include
asking a series of questions: 1) what happened; 2) what normally happens; 3) what does the
procedure require; 4) how did it happen; and 5) how are we managing it (Marx, 2007). Nurses
should be accountable and responsible (to themselves, patients, and the profession) to determine
why the mistake occurred instead of relying solely on the organization’s quality improvement
process.
Section III: Methods
Ethical Issues:
Health care providers are trained to deliver error-free care. No one sets out intending to
deliberately commit a medication error; however, despite education and experience, nurses still
make errors. Current estimates suggest that hospitalized patients are subjected to at least one
medication error per day (Aspen, et al., 2007). When mistakes happen, health care providers
experience a complex emotional response that includes devastation, embarrassment, desire to
conceal the mistakes, shifting blame, and resistance to implicate other providers (Wolf &
Hughes, 2008). Providers have an ethical obligation to tell the truth (veracity) to maintain the
trust (fidelity) between patient and provider. Unfortunately, medication errors are under reported,
unrecorded, and under-researched. Further explanations for under-reporting include not being
aware that a medication error has occurred, not being familiar with how to report the error, and
fear of legal ramifications or being perceived as incompetent (Brady, Malone & Fleming, 2009;
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Choo, Hutchinson & Bucknall, 2010; Dennison, 2007; Harding & Petrick, 2008; Wolf &
Serembus, 2004). Nevertheless, nurses have a moral, legal, and ethical obligation to report
mistakes.
Beneficence is an ethical principle that generally defines nurses. The ethics of caring is a
contractual model in which there is an agreement between nurse and patient; “there is an
acknowledgement by the patient that the professional practitioner has the requisite skill to make
the technical decisions” (Carper, 1979, p.17). In addition, the ethical principle of nonmaleficence
(do no harm) must be considered. Harm is defined as any “avoidable distress caused to the
patient in the course of providing care” (Grace, 2014, p.27). Harm is usually unintentional, but is
often avoidable. A nurse must have adequate skills and competence to safely administer
medications to a patient, however, errors can and do occur. These ethical principles of doing
good and preventing harm are violated when errors are not reported.
Medication errors are devastating to everyone; therefore there are many stakeholders for
this project. Consumers are the primary stakeholders as they are directly impacted by medication
errors; patients have the right to receive quality care that is free from errors. The second most
important stakeholders are the healthcare professionals. When nurses commit medication errors,
they become a second victim because they are traumatized and struggle with the anguish, quilt,
and loss of self-confidence as they deal with the aftermath of the error. In terms of medication
safety, nurse autonomy is equally as important as patient autonomy. Ensuring the anonymity of
the nurses participating in this change in practice project was paramount. In terms of increasing
near miss reporting, anonymity was maintained. Lastly, the Institutional Review Board for the
Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at the University of San Francisco granted exemption
status since this project was deemed a quality improvement project.
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Setting:
Local environment. With respect to the local care environment, the common element or
shared purpose, which would have the most likely influence of change, is that of patient safety.
Knowing that nurses are busy, the education module was administered through the hospital’s
learning management system, Healthstream©, in order to be more convenient for the nurse.
Instead of coming to work on a day off, the nurse was able to complete the module during
working hours. This however, was not without sacrifices. For instance, the nurse would
experience competing priorities with patient care needs during the shift and may not be fully
invested in learning. In order to complete the module, the nurse may choose to go through the
module very quickly, just to get it finished.
The hospital is located in a large county along the central coast of California. According
to the hospital website, the organization is designated as a Safety Net Hospital; this type of
hospital provides 50% of hospital care for the states 6.6 million uninsured and trains nearly half
of all new doctors in the state. The county owns the hospital; as such it is a government-run
organization. This is relevant since most government processes are time consuming,
cumbersome and convoluted. Planning the implementation of this evidence-based change in
practice project was no different.
Structure, processes, and patterns. The structure of the unit consists of one nursing
director (who also oversees three other nursing units), one supervising nurse who has assistant
director types of responsibilities, and two staff nurse III’s who are frequently in the role of
charge nurse on the day shift. Since both the staff nurse III’s work on the day shift, this results in
inconsistent oversight and follow up on the evening and night shifts. There are additional nurses
who assume the role of charge nurse on these off shifts. The Med/Surg unit admits a variety of
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different patient conditions and has a large number of indigent or uninsured patients. Workflow
consists of both eight and twelve hour shifts with a majority of full time nurses and few part-time
or per diem staff. The use of travelling nurses is low; however, the turnover rate has increased
over the past few months. Staff meetings are held every other month to keep the nursing staff
updated on how they are accomplishing specific quality metrics for core measures and a new
discharge process recently implemented.
One specific pattern of the setting was identified, both from personal experiences and
anecdotal accounts is a general resistance to change. The staff nurses are very hard workers,
however, they rarely want to participate in anything “extra”. There is a comfortable habit of
dysfunction within the unit, which was stated by several staff nurses. An overall consensus was
people knew what needed to be improved, but they were lacking direct support (i.e. increased
staffing to make it happen). There is a sense of defeat on the unit because despite identifying
issues, the administration “doesn’t listen, or do anything about it” and “nursing is the first place
they cut when times are tough”. As a result, nurses are not fully invested in developing their own
professional practice in order to improve patient outcomes. Communication within the
organization goes in both directions, however, there is a distinct perception that administration is
frequently “telling them what to do”.
Work processes. As a loosely coupled system, the Med/Surg unit lacks the characteristic
mutually understood rules that are consistently enforced trait of a tightly coupled organization
(Thompson, 2014). The nurses follow rules when the director is consistently on the unit;
however, policies are easily broken when the nursing director is not directly supervising the staff.
A simple, but specific, example of this is the policy of not having beverages on the workstation
on wheels (WOWs) while on the unit. When the director was off duty, due to a medical leave,
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the nurses would keep their beverages with then on the WOWs representing a direct violation of
the well-known and established policy.
Nurses on the unit were included in this evidence-based change in practice project.
Several nurses offered positive comments regarding the medication safety course that was
presented via Healthstream©. One on one interviews with nurses during working hours were
conducted to determine current practice with PCA use and augmented an online survey to
determine current knowledge and familiarity with the PCA policy as well as comfort levels
working with the devices.
Nurses in this setting were not proactive to changing their work processes and the status
quo is widely accepted. An example of the reaction to a change in the work process on the unit is
presented here. Certified nursing assistants (CNAs) are responsible for obtaining the vital signs
and documenting the results in the EHR. It is the responsibility of the nurse to review the vital
signs and act on abnormal findings. The supervising nurse noticed a pattern that abnormal vital
signs were being missed. Beginning in April 2014, the decision was made to have the CNAs
obtain the first set of vital signs (at 08:00am for example), and the primary nurse was to obtain
the second set of vital signs (at 12:00pm for example). One reason is so the nurse can be aware
first hand of any abnormal vital signs or significant changes from the patient’s baseline. Another
reason this change was implemented was an attempt to improve patient satisfaction scores
because the nurse would be spending more time with the patient and giving the patient more
direct attention. This recommendation was widely protested with the objection of having “extra
duties” to complete during the shift. The staff nurses were allowed to communicate their
concerns to the director and supervising nurse. The initial response was to “give it time to work”
with an explanation of the purpose of the change. Over the next few months, the nurses
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continued to protest this change, without offering any alternative recommendations to improve
the process. Effective in September 2014, the workflow returned how it was originally by
requiring the CNAs to get both sets of vital signs for the shift. This demonstrates that if the staff
nurses continually resist change, leadership will eventually acquiesce.
Planning the intervention:
The medication safety education program consisted of
1. a series of self-learning modules to identify the importance of having a safe
environment for medication administration in order to reduce harm as well as
understanding the human and system factors that impact safe medication
administration.
2. examples of near miss events, or actual medication errors to increase awareness
and completion of risk notifications in order to improve the working conditions by
identifying system-related medication administration problems.
3. a simulation experience to highlight safety while caring for a patient with a PCA.
The DNP student had the primary responsibility for coordinating the three components of
the education program: conducting a needs assessment, creating the education program (online
module and simulation exercise), and evaluating the entire process. A work breakdown structure
was created to assist with the planning (see Appendix R). The first step in implementing the
educational program was to fully understand the scope of the problem regarding medication
safety. A comprehensive review of the QRRs from the 2012 – 2013 fiscal year was completed.
Results confirmed there were breaches in the basic medication administration principles as well
as significant pharmacy issues. During review of the QRRs, the DNP student made
recommendations for redefining the medication event categories and subcategories in order to
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improve medication error reporting. The DNP student worked collaboratively with the quality
director, information technology (IT), the pharmacy director and the Nursing Informatics
Clinical Experts (NICE) team to fine-tune the dictionaries in the EHR. Appendix A has the
revised dictionary that was used in the risk module. To capitalize on the required education for
the risk module, an introductory medication safety PowerPoint (PPT) was introduced for the
clinical staff in conjunction with the implementation of the new online risk module.
To begin planning for the content of the medication safety course, a thorough literature
review was completed. Medication safety education is commonly recommended as a means to
improve patient outcomes. Lu, et al., (2013) reported a statistically significant improvement in
nurses’ knowledge of high-alert medications after a 60-minute PPT presentation was given as the
educational intervention. Educating nurses about safe administration of medications is
multifaceted and involves instruction about actions and uses of medications, safe dosage, side
effects, and nursing implications (Durham & Alden, 2008). In addition, nurses need education
about 1) the importance of having a safe environment for medication administration by reducing
distractions, improving lighting and minimizing noise levels (Choo, Hutchinson & Bucknall,
2010; Wolf, Hicks, & Serembus, 2006); 2) recognizing perceptual factors and the complexities
inherent in the medication administration process (Page & McKinney, 2007; Saintsing, Gibson,
& Pennington, 2011; Taneja & Wiegmann, 2004); and 3) integrating pharmacokinetics and
pharmacodynamics principles into clinical practice (Brady, Malone & Fleming, 2009; Choo,
Hutchinson & Bucknall, 2010; Durham & Alden, 2008; Sears, Goldworthy, & Goodman, 2010;
Page & McKinney, 2007). Furthermore, Currie et al., (2009) developed a patient safety
curriculum that included an overview of patient safety and promotion of mindfulness, hazard and
near miss reporting, quality improvement methods such as root cause analysis (RCA) or failure

MEDICATION SAFETY

29

mode effects analysis (FMEA) and the disclosure of adverse events in healthcare. Leadership
commitment, professional salience, preoccupation with failure, non-punitive environment,
systems conducive to error reporting, and strengthening communication were identified as
important dimensions of a safety culture (Currie, et al., 2009).
It was not realistic to plan a 60-minute presentation of medication safety for the staff
nurses on Med/Surg for many reasons, primarily because the education and quality directors
requested the presentation to be brief since the nurses would be expected to complete the course
during working hours. The underlying message was to keep the introductory medication safety
course to less than 15 slides. A very brief, introductory 12-slide PPT presentation was created to
highlight each of the above concepts. The full slide set for medication safety can be found in
Appendix B. This PPT presentation was used in conjunction with the “Patient Safety/Risk
Notifications” PPT presentation developed by the Quality Management staff. An excerpt of the
slides related to the risk management process and definitions of a medication error, near miss
event, and hazardous occurrence, which augmented the medication safety slides can be found in
Appendix C. The plan was to create a series of short self-learning modules about medication
safety further exploring each concept in more detail.
Unfortunately, nurses are often not aware that a medication error or near miss event has
occurred (Choo, Hutchinson & Bucknall, 2010) or what constitutes a medication error
(Dennison, 2007). One of the main tenets of the project was to provide clear definitions of these
events and highlight the importance of reporting them in order to identify and key areas for
improvement within the complex medication delivery system. Another goal was to emphasize
that the leadership team had a commitment to excellent patient care and patient safety and would
appreciate the feedback. Dennison (2007) recognized that supportive leadership is crucial in
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creating practice change using a culture of safety; continuing to blame the individual or expect
error-free performance is not realistic. A culture of safety will augment the reporting process of
medication errors and reduce the likelihood that the same type of error will reoccur (Harding &
Petrick, 2008; Wolf, Hicks, & Serembus, 2006). Benner et al. (2002) identified a concept known
as practice responsibility; which refers to individual accountability and experiential learning that
is shared with others to collectively change practice by creating a safer patient care environment.
Just culture theory is essential when educating nurses about medication safety and how to avoid
adverse patient outcomes. The plan at the beginning of the project was to expand on these
concepts through a comprehensive medication safety education program.
The second step in implementing the educational program was to survey the staff to
identify current practice when caring for a patient with a PCA device. Gathering these data
provides a better understanding of the barriers and obstacles that exist. Using an online survey,
the current knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs regarding the use of PCAs as a means to manage
postoperative pain can be assessed so the education module can focus on areas of confusion or
misunderstanding.
The third step included analyzing these data and developing the simulation scenario. One
goal of this proposal was to provide a simulation experience in a safe environment highlighting
the nursing management of a patient with a PCA in order to improve assessment, care, and
documentation. Developing a simulation scenario is challenging; it requires careful forethought
and planning, has to be educationally sound, realistic, and based on evidence (Aschenbrenner,
Milgrom, & Settles, 2012). Although Lu, et al., (2013) reported a statistically significant
improvement in nurses’ knowledge of high-alert medications after a 60-minute PPT presentation
was given as the educational intervention, a tailored and innovative education program for nurses
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was necessary to change the culture and attitudes toward PCA management at this small county
hospital. Developing a simulation scenario as a educational method would increase the
mindfulness of critical components of the PCA policy and highlight the common adverse drugs
events (ADEs) associated with PCAs as well as potential ways an error could be made. When
learners participate in simulation, they are more likely to be able to quickly adapt to changing
events and identify evolving patterns in a patient’s condition (Clancy, Effken & Pesut, 2008;
Glasgow, Dunphy, & Mainous, 2010). Nurses can safely experience a variety of situations that
put the nurse at risk for committing a medication error or failure to identify ADEs related to PCA
usage. Being more cognizant of the factors contributing to PCA related errors will enhance
accountability when caring for a patient with a PCA for the management of postoperative pain.
The content for the simulation was determined from the surveys and interviews, from
which specific learning objectives could be developed. Med/Surg nurses were targeted for initial
implementation due to the frequency of caring for patients on PCAs. There were three different
concepts for the simulation scenarios that resulted from meetings with the directors from
education, quality management and pharmacy. The education director wanted a scenario that was
centered on recognizing a change in the patient’s condition requiring prompt assessment and
intervention (such as a decreased in respiratory rate or altered level of consciousness); in this
situation, a rapid response team notification would be appropriate. The quality management
director requested a scenario that involved an embedded medication error in the scenario in order
for the nurse to identify the error and complete a risk notification (QRR) using the new online
risk module. Lastly, the pharmacy director requested a scenario that focused on the key problem
areas of documentation occurred during change of provider, discontinuing a PCA, when a
syringe is changed, and when a dose is increased. Scenario development worksheets were
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created for each of these potential documentation problems (see Appendix D1-D4) because this
was the area of highest need for the organization. In addition, this decision was based on results
of direct observational experiences and one to one interviews with nurses where inconsistencies
were noted regarding when a co-signature was required for documentation of the volume and
dose infused via the PCA device. Once developed, piloted, and validated, the simulation
scenarios can be published with the California Simulation Alliance (CSA) as a resource for other
hospitals to use for PCA education, medication error reporting, and rapid response team
activation training.
Aim of entity being changed. The primary goal of the nursing director of the Med/Surg
floor and the pharmacy director was to improve compliance with PCA documentation. The
secondary goal of the quality and pharmacy directors was to also increase reporting of near miss
events. The nursing staff on the Med/Surg unit does not realize they are part of the bigger
system. They view themselves as somewhat independent or an isolated entity. They generally do
not feel as though they can make a difference (individually or collectively) or that administration
will listen to or act on any concerns brought forward. As the beneficiaries of care, the patient was
never identified as an overt consideration, but rather, an incidental result. The staff nurses
collectively were more focused on getting the task done. Of course there were some exceptions
and some nurses put their patient’s needs first. The nursing staff on the unit does not see or
embrace the notion that they are change agents as a means to improve patient outcomes. For
example, an over bed trapeze was needed for a patient who was a paraplegic. It took over three
days to locate all the components of the trapeze and set it up for the patient. Several staff nurses
were apathetic to the situation and there was no sense of urgency to find the equipment in order
to improve the patient care experience.
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The hospital was recently selected to become the area’s Level II trauma center. Staff
nurses at the hospital recognized this as a milestone and were generally excited about the
accomplishment. However, the implementation plan for the trauma designation requires specific
trauma-related education. The education department was focused on providing the education and
getting the “box checked” that it was done. The impact or change in practice as a result of the
education was not being evaluated or reinforced because there are no role models on the
Med/Surg unit to help mentor, support, and encourage sustainable changes in practice.
Leadership needs. Leadership within the hospital supported this evidence-based change
in practice project. The previous chief nursing officer (CNO) was involved in the project prior to
resigning; however, the new CNO was not committed to this project until recently. The
Med/Surg director was supportive at the very beginning of the proposal; however, she relied
heavily on the supervising nurse and her staff nurse III’s to help. Unfortunately, these nurses
were often “too busy”, had conflicting priorities, or were unavailable to help consistently, which
resulted in several significant project delays. Each director from education, pharmacy, and
quality were very helpful in the initial stages of the project, however each person had their own
needs and agendas that prevented their full support and participation. Several organizational
projects, including a Joint Commission survey and the trauma education, interfered with a
seamless role out of this evidence-based change in practice project. As a result, the leadership
needs were only partially met.
Cost/Benefit Analysis: There is a collaborative relationship between the local college
and the small county hospital. As a result of this partnership, a partial grant budget of $175,000
dollars was available for this project proposal as well as pre-established contractual deliverables.
The complete pro forma operating statement for this project is available in Appendix E for
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review. Resources required for this project include primarily the time and energy investment of
the DNP student to create the education module about PCA management, safe medication
practices, and the simulation scenario. Meetings between the student, education director,
pharmacy director, quality management director and other relevant parties (selected committee
members, chief nursing officer, unit based nursing directors, etc.) would occur during their
working hours, and therefore would not incur additional expenses.
The DNP student anticipated approximately 300 hours to complete the project. These
hours are broken down to developing and analyzing the results of the surveys (60 hours),
researching, creating and implementing the education program (180 hours), and exploring best
practice, designing a simulation experience, and implementing the simulation exercise (60
hours). A simulation technician, currently 100% funded through a grant, will be needed each
time the scenario is run (approximately 60 hours including set up and take down). The supply
costs are minimal and would include moulage, syringes, intravenous solutions and equipment,
saline flushes, simulated tablets etc. There will also be costs for the small incentive/gift for each
nurse who completes the pre and post survey. There is the possibility for the loss of productivity
to the organization if the survey is completed during working hours. In order to minimize
disruption to the unit, nurses will likely require compensation to complete the simulation
scenario during non-working hours. It is estimated that completing the activities would
necessitate approximately two-three hours of time. Total estimated cost of the intervention is
$62,368.
The financial focus of the educational intervention was not to generate revenue, but
rather, to mitigation risk. Risk-mitigation requires certain assumptions related to frequency and
cost of errors. It was difficult to obtain accurate costs due to the voluntary nature of reporting
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adverse drug events (ADEs); actual numbers of ADEs and associated costs are grossly
underestimated (Pinella, Murillo, Carrasco, & Humet, 2006; Wahr, et al., 2013). Furthermore, an
independent audit of a small state hospital found much higher rates of medication errors than
were self-reported by a ratio of 244:1 (Grasso, Rothschild, Jordan, & Jayaram, 2005); this one
study provides a glimpse into the actual scope of the problem. It is known that there are at least
1.5 million preventable medication errors and ADEs occur each year in the United States,
excluding errors of omission (Aspden et al., 2007). Current estimates suggest that hospitalized
patients are subjected to at least one medication error per day (Aspen, et al., 2007). The
probability of avoidable ADEs from an injectable medication is 3.3% (Lahue, et al., 2012);
therefore, the hospital can expect to have 12 events related to injectable medications per year
(based on the potential for 365 errors/year). The probability of a narcotic/analgesic related ADE
per occurrence is 0.33% with a 95% confidence interval (Lahue, et al., 2012); this represents
approximately four events related to narcotics per year. Granted, these are likely to be
conservative numbers; according to Andel, et al., (2012) preventable medical error (of which
medications are included) may actually be ten times higher.
Reported incremental costs of an ADE range from $2,000-$9,000 (AHRQ, 2001; Pinella,
Murillo, Carrasco, & Humet, 2006; Aspen, Wolcott, Bootman & Cronenwett, 2007; Leapfrog
Group, 2008; Lahue, et al., 2012); therefore averaging these amounts, the cost of an ADE is
estimated to be $5,500 in additional costs per hospitalization. This amount is exclusive of
medical professional liability (MPL), administrative costs, or litigation fees. Additional direct
costs of an ADE consist of the medical costs to payer (extended length of stay, additional
medications, physician visits) and lawsuits (Lahue, et al., 2012). The average incremental annual
costs for preventable ADEs was $600,000 in payer costs, the average annual MPL cost
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associated with ADEs from injectable medications was $72,000 per hospital, and legal settlement
costs averaged $376,500 per case (Lahue, et al., 2012). Indirect costs of ADEs may include
missed work, reduced quality of life or disability for the patient, pain and suffering, and even
death (Lahue, et al., 2012). Based on quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), a conservative
estimate of the economic impact of medical errors is calculated with an estimated ten years of
life lost at an approximate cost of $75,000-$100,000 per year (Andel, et al., 2012). In addition,
the employee who made the error may call in sick necessitating the inclusion of replacement
costs to cover the shift. Total estimated cost of savings benefit related to avoiding one
medication error secondary to a narcotic agent is $487,690; Appendix F has the complete
cost/benefit analysis.
Responsibility matrix. The complete responsibility matrix can be located in Appendix
G. The proposal for the evidence-based change in practice project was presented to the director
of education, who then requested that the directors from quality management and pharmacy were
included as well. The project plans were also communicated with the director of the Med/Surg
unit. Both the quality management and pharmacy directors had a vested interest in increasing the
near miss event reporting and welcomed the review of the previous fiscal year’s QRRs for an
unbiased perspective and to identify any trends or patterns if present. Although no specific trends
were noted, the pharmacy director requested help to determine the reason for non-compliance
issues related to documentation with new PCA devices the hospital had recently purchased to
improve patient safety. Several meetings were conducted with the pharmacy director to ascertain
the scope of the problem. Within the education department, communication was also maintained
with a staff nurse III as a liaison to the education director in terms of helping to coordinate the
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simulation scenarios. The DNP student assumed the majority of the responsibility for these
aspects of the project.
The quality management director had the responsibility of implementing a new risk
module for online reporting and requested assistance to redefine the medication event
dictionaries to facilitate the reporting process. The DNP student had a supportive role for this
aspect of the project. Communication needs branched out to include an information technology
specialist, and members of the nursing informatics clinical expert (NICE) team. Meetings were
centered on reviewing the new online QRR process as well as updated/redefining the medication
event dictionaries. In addition, while planning the education for the new online reporting process,
there was an opportunity to include the first introductory medication safety PowerPoint for
clinical staff only. The PowerPoint was reviewed by the NICE team and approved for
distribution.
Implementation of the Project:
In order to start the evidence-based change in practice project, a memorandum of
understanding was required. Approval from the agency and county counsel for the MOU began
in April 2013 and was officially signed in late September 2013. Preliminary planning meetings
occurred between the DNP student and the education director (who was also the student’s
preceptor at the agency). During these meetings, the idea of improving medication safety was
presented as well as improving the incidence of near miss reports. With a conceptual framework
of “Just Culture”, it was agreed that the project would benefit the staff of the Med/Surg unit and
the agency as a whole. The idea of a simulation was readily embraced because the hospital had
just purchased a simulation manikin and was renovating the education department to include a
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simulation suite. April 2014 was the scheduled timeline for the simulation manikin to arrive and
the simulation suite to become fully operational.
The director of education helped to coordinate a few meetings with the pharmacy and
quality management directors because they each had a vested interest in this project. Between
October and November 2013, 604 medication-related QRRs were reviewed and analyzed for
trends and patterns. To obtain further insight into the scope of the problem, the DNP student
attended a couple of meetings specific to evaluating medication events, including one in which
the results of the annual Medication Error Reduction Program (MERP) were reported.
During November 2103 and January 2014, the DNP student was actively involved in
meeting with quality management, information technology, pharmacy, and the NICE team to
learn and review the online QRR reporting process, which was scheduled to go live in February
2014. Suggestions were made to improve the reporting process as well as providing
recommendation for a new medication event dictionary. The original medication event dictionary
consisted of 56 entries; this was streamlined to 8 new categories and 33 subcategories (see
Appendix A). The introductory PowerPoint on medication safety was prepared for the clinical
staff and reviewed by the team for approval to be used in conjunction with the education for the
new risk notification process that was being implemented in February 2014.
During January 2014 to February 2014, there were three meetings with the pharmacy
director to gain understanding of the PCA issues the department was experiencing. Initial reports
from the pharmacy director indicated that the nurses on Med/Surg were not following the new
policy regarding the frequency of assessments that were being documented. A couple members
of the NICE team were included in these meetings in order to get a nursing perspective on the
scope of the problem. In early February, the DNP student was scheduled for a training session

MEDICATION SAFETY

39

with members from the NICE team to learn how to operate the PCA pump and shown the
required documentation steps. Once the DNP student became comfortable with the PCA pumps,
the observations and interviews with the Med/Surg staff nurses regarding their current practice
while caring for patients with a PCA device was able to commence. A new orthopedic surgery
service was started in the spring 2014, so there were many hopes that patients with PCAs would
be available (status post a total knee or hip replacement).
The purpose of the observations and interviews were two fold: 1) to gather data regarding
current practice with PCA devices and 2) to provide “just in time” education to those interviewed
who were not fully aware or complying to the policy. Unfortunately, there were many challenges
in scheduling because the floor did not consistently have patients with a PCA pump;
furthermore, when patients were present on the unit, the DNP student was not able to be at the
hospital due to conflicts with the student’s full-time work schedule. Over the course of six
weeks, a total of four nurses were observed and interviewed regarding their care of the patient
with a PCA.
The few observations did not add much insight to the issue. The nurses who were most
comfortable caring for patients with a PCA device, were also the one who were the most familiar
with the policy and therefore compliant with the established documentation requirements. The
goal was to focus the education on the nurses who did not consistently care for patients with a
PCA. In March 2014, an online survey was created to assess the current knowledge, attitudes,
and beliefs regarding the use of PCAs as a means to manage postoperative pain. Once the first
draft was complete, the survey was sent via email to the hospital’s librarian, who was considered
to be a Survey Monkey expert. A meeting was scheduled with the librarian to review the survey
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and obtain feedback on the survey questions (see Appendix H). The survey was live for a period
of three weeks from March 23rd – April 10th.
The results of the survey were analyzed by the end of April. Initial attempts to schedule
meetings with the education, pharmacy and quality management directors to provide the results
of the survey were unsuccessful, due to competing priorities with hospital projects or vacation
time. A meeting was eventually scheduled with the education director at the beginning of June.
During the meeting, the survey results were reported and a request was placed to get a copy of
the results from the medication safety course on Healthstream©. This is when the
implementation plan for the project got off track and then continued to deteriorate.
During the months from mid-June to September, two-way communication and
collaboration between the agency and the DNP student came to a standstill. In July and August,
four attempts were made to obtain the results of the medication safety course on Healthstream©
from the education department; the results were finally obtained at the beginning of September.
The explanations for the delay was the result of staff turnover in the education department, so no
one was sure how to access or where to find the results.
In July, August, and September, several emails and phone calls to pharmacy and quality
management were made to obtain the financial information regarding the cost of a medication
error, litigation costs, and fees for Medical Professional Liability (MPL) insurance to estimate a
possible return on investment. In addition, during the time period, the DNP student requested
updated information about PCA use on the Med/Surg unit (to include results of the PCA audits
completed by pharmacy), pharmacy reports regarding PCA and naloxone (Narcan) concomitant
use, as well as the number of rapid response team (RRT) calls that may be related to PCA use.
Lastly, requests were made for any adverse drug event (ADE) reports associated with PCAs,
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updated medication error and near miss event rates for FY2014, and number of occurrences of
medication delivery on Med/Surg (specifically injectable medications). This information was
needed to develop the simulation scenario that was specific to the identified deficit and to meet
the needs of the pharmacy director. The only emails that were received from the agency during
the specified time period were automatically generated “out of office” notifications due to
scheduled vacations.
In September, one email was received from the pharmacy director indicating that
documentation was the main problem for the nurses when caring for patients with PCA devices;
however, the email lacked any specific details. Also, the results of the Healthstream© course
were received around the same time and efforts were made to move forward with the simulation
scenario. Several draft scenario development worksheets (Appendix D1-D4) were created
because without specific data from pharmacy or access to the PCA audits, it was difficult to
determine the exact documentation issue that was most problematic.
Support was requested and received from the Med/Surg director; the DNP student was
directed to work closely with the staff nurse III on the Med/Surg floor to determine the unit’s
perspective and their specific needs and gaps with PCA documentation. The Med/Surg director
also warned the DNP student that the staff nurses were difficult to get motivated. During this
time, the staff nurse III on the Med/Surg unit was very busy and did not respond quickly to email
and could not be reached by phone. Several attempts were made to schedule days to review, pilot
and validate the simulation scenario; three days were scheduled but each day was cancelled by
the staff nurse III. By the end of the month, the DNP student had received a message that the
staff nurse III was on vacation until mid-October. The DNP student then contacted the
supervising nurse who was able to provide some assistance.
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On October 6th, a meeting was finally scheduled with the directors from pharmacy,
quality management and education. At this time, much of the data previously requested was
provided, but not all. Unfortunately, the actual QRR data reported using the new online module
was not released to the DNP student. No financial information was available regarding costs of
medication error or from lawsuits because the primary patients served by the hospital is not a
litigious population. The quality management recalls the hospital being sued twice in the past 20
years, with each settlement being less than $100,000. Furthermore, all of the directors were
unaware of the exact nursing workflow with the PCAs to be able to provide any feedback on the
draft simulation scenarios.
Lastly, the simulation suite was still in progress; the manikin had arrived, the suite was
built, but the hospital was waiting for the audio/visual equipment to be installed. The DNP
student already anticipated this and alternate plans were being made to conduct the simulations
in situ on the actual Med/Surg unit. Final attempts were made on Oct 8th and 9th to pilot the
scenario, but the supervising nurse was not available to help on those days. At this time, the DNP
student made a very difficult decision to cease further attempts to implement the remainder of
the project due to time constraints and a project due date of October 15th.
Planning the study of the intervention:
Assessment plans. Using the PDSA cycle, the first test of change was the introductory
medication safety education course placed on Healthstream©. This course was assigned only to
the clinical staff in the hospital. Upon completion of the course, staff nurses are expected to pass
the post-test with a score of 80% or better. Due to a miscommunication, the quality management
staff developed the post-test. After the introductory medication safety education course was
created, there was uncertainty if approval was granted to place the course on Healthstream©. The
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DNP student had the impression the course was not going to be used, so post-test questions were
not written. Nevertheless, upon realizing the course was in fact being used, the DNP student
planned to obtain the results of the post-test to determine knowledge gaps specific to the nurses
working on the Med/Surg unit. In addition, the number of medication events being reported,
from February to September 2014, would be compared to the preceding time period.
The second test of change was focused on improving compliance regarding PCA
documentation and increasing the number of near miss events being reported. Initial plans were
to collect data (between January and March) from one on one interviews, nurse observations, the
Healthstream© course results, and the needs assessment to create a targeted simulation scenario
to address the practice deficiencies with the PCAs (which were later identified to be
documentation issues). The needs assessment consisted of 20 questions (see Appendix H) related
to the policy and procedure as well as nurse comfort in caring for patients with a PCA device.
Planned simulation exercises were to be conducted in April, either in the education department if
the simulation equipment was ready or in situ on the actual Med/Surg unit. The simulation was
expected to be approximately 15-20 minutes in length including pre-brief and debrief. The
anticipated outcome of the simulation exercise was 1) increase awareness of the need to report
near miss events and 2) improved compliance with PCA documentation requirements.
Administration of the needs assessment survey was scheduled as a follow up to the first one to
compare results after participation in the simulation scenarios.
Gap analysis. The current clinical state and baseline data prior to implementing the
evidence-based change in practice project revealed a few gaps in practice. The pharmacy director
stated there were gaps with near miss reporting, which resulted in a deficiency in their annual
MERP reporting. An issue regarding the clinical practice of nurses while using PCA devices was
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noted. According to the pharmacy director, approximately 1/3 of nurses were not documenting
on the PCA intervention EHR screens appropriately. In addition, the pharmacy director also
reported an increase in the number of adverse drug reaction reports related to opioids (morphine
specifically). See Appendix I for complete gap analysis.
Gantt chart. A Gantt chart of the entire project can be found in Appendix J. This chart
shows the original and updated timeline for this evidence-based change in practice project as a
result of multiple delays from several unexpected obstacles. Initial milestones are indicated as
well as actual dates of completion. There were four sub-projects that made up the entire project.
Per the responsibility matrix, not all steps of the project were the sole responsibility of the DNP
student; for instance, the actual implementation of the online reporting module was identified as
agency responsibility. Developing the medication safety education self-learning module,
determining the scope of the PCA noncompliance issue and creating the simulation experience
were the DNP student’s responsibility.
Nature of initial process change planned. The nurses on Med/Surg were directly
connected with this activity. A “natural” work group was not evident on the unit because the
floor nurses had variable schedules. It was hoped that the Med/Surg staff nurse III would have a
vested interest in helping the DNP student to solicit volunteers for the simulation scenario and be
available on the unit to ensure patient needs were still met when a nurse came to the simulation
experience for 15-20 minutes; however, the staff nurse III was not very comfortable or
knowledgeable about the PCA pumps and was not willing to help during implementation of the
evidence-based change in practice project.
Leading the change. The DNP student was expected to lead the effort to implement the
evidence-based change in practice project for the majority of the project. The director of
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education, quality management, and pharmacy were available for support, encouragement, and
guidance. With no previous project management or formal leadership experience, the DNP
student expected some challenges with the implementation of the project. Because the agency is
also a teaching hospital, the DNP student felt the environment would be conducive to learning as
a result of the collaborative relationship with their university affiliate. Also, nurses would likely
be more receptive to learning about new strategies to improve patient outcomes as a result their
own work processes. The DNP student was curious about which educational methodology would
be the best to produce a change in behavior. The change of behavior would be measured in
increased compliance with vital sign documentation for patients on PCAs and an increase in the
number of near miss medication reports. There were plenty of resources available from the
various directors being very willingness to assist in the project to the availability of the actual
equipment needed for the simulation experience.
Methods of Evaluation and Analysis:
Instruments used, analytic methods, and software used. Several assessment strategies
were utilized when evaluating the effectiveness of the implementation. Post-tests from the
Healthstream© course were used to determine baseline understanding of medication safety for
the nurses on Med/Surg. Although the DNP student did not participate in developing the posttest questions, several questions were still relevant. Unfortunately, the DNP student was only
able to obtain these results as an aggregate; responses to individual questions were not available.
The needs assessment was conducted through an online Survey Monkey© and generated a
variety of descriptive results, including nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio measurement
variables. Survey Monkey© was also planned for the post-simulation/reflection evaluation
surveys (see Appendix K for full post-simulation evaluation questions). Plans for full
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implementation of the self-learning module are still being finalized. If the DNP student is
permitted to place the learning modules on Healthstream©, then that platform would be used to
evaluate the pre/post-tests for initial results. Then the DNP student would compare the results
between the two and determine the amount of improvement using simple ratios. Otherwise, the
DNP student will construct the self-learning module on paper, and use a Scantron© or
paper/pencil format to collect the results. All of the instruments and surveys were created by the
DNP student with the exception of the post-test for the introductory medication safety education
course on Healthstream©, which was developed by the quality management department.
SWOT analysis. Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats are fully described in
Appendix L. The strength of the education program is the multidisciplinary support received
from the directors of the Med/Surg unit, pharmacy, education, and quality management; the
previous interim chief nursing officer (CNO) supported the intervention as well. However, the
biggest weakness and threat is the potential resistance, lack of support and cooperation from the
individual staff nurses. Without a culture of safety, nurses may feel threatened or fear a negative
performance review. Perhaps a bigger threat is trying to schedule time for nurses to attend the
simulation experience. There are opportunities to market and publish the simulation scenario and
education module.
Return on investment. A break-even analysis was difficult to measure for an
educational intervention. Education is often the first to be limited or eliminated when hospitals
look at their bottom line because it is considered “non-productive” time; adding training hours is
met with resistance (Zigmont, 2014). In addition, participants must have the desire to learn with
the right climate to transfer the new knowledge (Dennison, 2007). The goal of the educational
intervention was to avoid adverse outcomes, thereby preventing any additional costs to the
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organization related to uncompensated expenses, increases in MPL fees, or litigation expenses.
Specific details outlining the cost/benefit analysis were previously discussed in the Methods
section of this paper (also see Appendix F). Many assumptions were required since financial data
for the agency were not available. Direct, indirect and incremental costs were estimated based on
the available literature about medication errors.
The presentation of options for the business plan proposal can be found in Appendix M,
the operating statement is available in Appendix E, and the cost/benefit analysis is found in
Appendix F. With respect to financial forecasting, if more occurrences are prevented, then the
cost savings will increase. Medication error and ADE rates can be evaluated quarterly for the
number of near miss reports and ADEs, change in MPL and payer costs, as well as legal fees.
Sustainability can be established with annual competency testing or simulation exercises to keep
nurses mindful of safe medication practices.
In terms of ADEs, the quantity represents the number of occurrences that need to be
avoided in order to realize a return on investment. The fixed cost for implementing the education
module and simulation experience for nurses to enhance their knowledge and understanding of
caring for patients with patient-controlled analgesic devices is found on the operating statement
($62,368). In terms of preventing adverse outcomes, the price can be assumed to be the average
cost of an ADE, annual payer and MPL costs associated with narcotic injectable ADEs, legal
settlement costs and indirect costs ($487,690). Therefore, the hospital would need to avoid only
one occurrence as a result of the educational intervention in order to break even. When totaled,
for a moderate estimate for four events, the average additional cost per year is $1,928,760,
resulting in an ROI of 30% when conservative direct and indirect costs are included (see
Appendix N for full explanation of the Return on Investment and Break-Even Analysis).
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Conceptual and operational definitions. The operational definitions of medication
occurrences were included in the staff training PPT created by the quality management
department. The hospital describes the different types of occurrences as:


Error: An unintended event or act. This can be something that was done or something
that should have been done but wasn’t.



Near Miss: An event that was “caught” and caused no harm, but for which a recurrence
carries a significant chance of harm.



Hazardous Condition: Any set of circumstances, which significantly increase the
likelihood of a serious adverse outcome.

Despite these definitions, there was evidence from review of the QRRs that some degree of
confusion or misunderstanding existed as near miss events were categorized as errors. The
quality management director acknowledged the problem and realized that some of the
medication event categories are actually near miss events and also indicated that the data are
based on how the person entering the data choose to categorize the event.
Section IV: Results
Program Evaluation:
Nature of setting and improvement intervention. The Med/Surg unit operates with an
average daily census of 22-24 patients on a 33-bed floor. The nurses administer approximately
14 medications per patient per day according to pharmacy. The incidence of PCA use on
Med/Surg is outlined in table two. Data were requested in July 2014 regarding concomitant use
of naloxone (Narcan) and a patient receiving analgesic via PCA device, but at the time of this
writing, the report from pharmacy for patients receiving both PCA and Narcan was not provided
to the DNP student. The quality management department reported no rapid response team calls
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as a result of respiratory depression or arrest secondary to PCA use. Both reports were requested
within the time frame from October 2013 to September 2014.

# of PCA patients/day

Medical/Surgical Unit
2.7

# of patients started on a PCA/day

0.45

# of syringes used/average patient

3.83

PCA=Patient Controlled Analgesia
Table 2: Incidence of PCA use.
Both AIM statements could not be measured within the specified time period. The first
AIM statement suggested that the number of QRR reports would increase by 10% after the
educational intervention. Unfortunately, there were discrepancies noted in the way QRRs were
categorized; with the new online reporting module, several near miss event categories were
labeled erroneously as a medication error. Actual error reports were not made available to the
DNP student; however, when a near miss report was generated, the results produced only four
entries from February to September. However, without actual baseline data and the confusion
between near miss events and medication event categories, the DNP student was not able to
determine the actual increase in the number of QRR events being reported. Despite providing
clear definitions of the categories of medication events in the educational PPT, a change of
behavior was not measurable.
The second AIM statement proposed a 50% increase in PCA documentation compliance.
The compliance issues regarding PCA documentation were discussed with the pharmacy director
prior to implementing the project; however, a baseline compliance level could not be established
and comparisons could not be made because chart audits were not made available to the DNP
student. Results of the needs assessment related to PCA use were presented to the nursing staff at
scheduled staff meetings. Nurses appeared surprised to learn they were over documenting on
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some parameters and under documenting on others. See Appendix P for the handout provided to
the nurses at the staff meeting.
Another contextual factor of the implementation was working with three additional
directors (education, quality management, and pharmacy). The DNP student often felt conflicted
in establishing priorities based on each director’s needs. In retrospect, it would have been
beneficial to coordinate communications with just one person; however, due to the obstacles
experienced with communication, it is hypothesized that the project would have experienced
even more delays. On the positive side, working with all three directors provided the DNP
student with an interesting perspective of the entire operations within the agency.
Evolution of initial improvement plan. The project was forced to evolve over time due
to delays in acquiring the necessary information (i.e. results of the Healthstream post-test and
results from the PCA audits). Only one small portion of the project was implemented in a timely
fashion because the agency had a firm “go live” date for the new risk module for online QRR
reporting. Even this part of the project was not without difficulties. As previously mentioned, the
DNP student was told the medication safety education course, when added to the training for the
risk module, would be too long for the staff to complete and therefore not be used. The DNP
student learned in late February that the medication safety education course was a requirement
for the nursing staff to complete.
Education regarding the documentation requirements while caring for patients with a
PCA device was challenging as well. It was difficult to determine the exact nature and scope of
the problem. According to the pharmacy director, chart audits on PCA documentation indicated
that nurses were not meeting requirements of the policy and the hospital received a Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) alert indicating that documentation of patient
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assessments and vital signs was not consistent with the current policy. The needs assessment
survey was created to determine the current level of knowledge and understanding with the new
PCA policy and documentation requirements. The DNP student was not able to provide real time
education about the PCAs because of delays in coordinating schedules to learn how the PCA
pump operates and the expected documentation requirements. In addition, often times, the DNP
student was not available at the same time a patient with a PCA device was admitted to the
Med/Surg floor. Furthermore, “super users” on the unit as well as from members of the NICE
team were providing additional PCA training without any coordination with the DNP student.
Creating the simulation scenario was delayed until specific data was obtained about the
PCA documentation problem as stated by pharmacy. Results of PCA chart audits and baseline
compliance rates were not made available to the DNP student. Despite not having the
information, the DNP student continued to develop drafts of scenarios based on a variety of
possible documentation issues. Additional delays were experienced when the staff nurse III and
supervising nurse on Med/Surg were not available to help pilot or validate the scenarios. This
was an example of another pattern of care identified earlier; nurses on Med/Surg have the
perception that things are being done to them, that they are being forced to change their habits
without realizing that patient care and safety are at stake.
Change in care process. Regrettably, patient care was not changed during the
implementation of the evidence-based change in practice project. The results of the medication
safety education course on Healthstream© demonstrated that 49/51 (96%) staff nurses assigned
to Med/Surg successfully completed the course; completion of the course was mandatory as
determined by the quality management department. Of the nurses who completed the course,
29/49 (59.2%) scored 100%, 12/49 (24.5%) obtained a score of 90%, and 8/49 (16.3%) achieved
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an overall score of 80% (which was the minimum required to pass the course). Upon further
analysis, the above scores were all acquired on the first attempt to complete the course.
Forty-three percent of the nursing staff participated in the online needs assessment about
the PCA policy and comfort level in operating the pumps. The results of the survey indicated
only 37% of the staff nurses were very comfortable operating the pumps and 32% were very
familiar with the current PCA policy. With greater than 60% of the staff being moderately
comfortable/familiar or not at all comfortable/familiar, there was an opportunity to increase not
only the familiarity with the PCA policy, but also the comfort level when working with the PCA
infusion pumps. When analyzing the assessment frequency data specific to the PCA policy,
results indicated that the staff actually over-assess their patients’ vital signs on initiation of the
PCA pump, with dose increases, and during PCA therapy in terms of how often each parameter
is being measured. Some possible explanations for the differences in responses could be
confusion in the way the question was asked or not reading the question correctly. Pertinent
results of the needs assessment regarding PCA use can be found in Appendix O.
System/process failures. One process failure came with the construction of the needs
assessment survey itself. All of the questions were voluntary to answer; the hope was that the
nurses would elect to answer the questions willingly. In hindsight, this decision was likely a
mistake. Almost half of the nurses responding skipped the majority of the questions. This could
be because they were interrupted due to patient care needs, they elected not to answer the
questions or they were unfamiliar with the policy and didn’t want to answer incorrectly. In
contrast, 100% of nurses answered the first two demographic questions in terms of years of
nursing experience and specifically, how long they worked on the Med/Surg floor. In addition,
the responses to frequency of monitoring were likely confusing to the nurses responding. For
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example, the frequency of monitoring for a dose increase is every 15 minutes times two, then the
expected frequency of monitoring is every two hours; based on the responses to this question,
only 25% selected the every two hours option. A possible explanation for these results is that the
nurses most likely selected the vital sign monitoring specific to the dose increase, and did not
also select the frequency of on-going monitoring.
One important result that was noted provides an opportunity for the hospital to collect
better information on the number of medication errors and near miss events. According to
Stratton, Blegen, Pepper, and Vaughn (2004), the national average of the number of medication
errors per 1000 patient days was 5.66 in adult acute care units. At this agency, the medication
error data was not reported in the same manner; however, total numbers of patient days were
available allowing the DNP student to calculate the error rate per 1000 patient days as a means of
comparison. As reported in Table 1, the average number of medication related QRRs for fiscal
year 2013 (July 2012-June 2013) calculated per 1000 patient days were 15.35 and 11.26 for the
2014 fiscal year. This number is much higher than the national average because it is believed to
have near miss events being reported as medication errors, when in fact, the error never actually
reached the patient.
Section V: Discussion
Summary:
Key successes and difficulties. The success of this evidence-based change in practice
project was the experience the DNP student gained from planning, implementing and evaluating
a project of this scope and breadth. The opportunity to work with the three directors from
education, quality management and pharmacy allowed for a much broader perspective of the
agency’s operations and processes and provided access to multiple areas of the hospital.
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However, communication was a barrier due to many scheduling conflicts; only a few meetings
were scheduled and most of the communication was via email or phone messages. Nevertheless,
the opportunity to understand the scope of the problem, from different departments, with PCA
documentation was incredibly valuable to examine the macrosystem functioning of the
organization and to begin to understand the complexity of the documentation process.
Although no changes in care delivery were directly observed, the DNP student was able
to begin to raise awareness of the importance of reporting actual and near miss medication events
in order to make the medication administration process safer for patients. Another success of the
project was to identify and clarify the frequency of PCA vital sign monitoring expectations per
the hospital’s policy and procedure. The strength of the project was the thoroughness of the
investigation to examine the scope of the issue and to determine the correct androgogical
methodology to provide a comprehensive educational experience in order to change clinical
practice. The educational plan did not include a “one size fits all” approach, but rather, the
education was tailored to the specific needs of the Med/Surg unit. The absence of timely
feedback to determine the effectiveness of one intervention before testing another method
hindered the implementation of the project; as a result, the DNP student could not obtain updated
information to evaluate the scope of the practice change.
One major difficulty experienced was the timeliness of the information received from the
various departments. Two-way communication stopped over the summer months (June-October)
for a variety of reasons, some known and unknown. What was known about the lack of
communication was that either the quality management director or the pharmacy director were
on vacation and not available at various and multiple times during that period. In addition, there
were staffing turnovers in the education department as well that delayed obtaining the results of
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the Healthstream© module and learning the questions that were used for the post-test. Another
area of difficulty was the cessation of free-flowing information and collaboration. A lot of data
was shared with the DNP student in the early stages of the project; however, when additional
data was requested (from June-October), the data was no longer being provided or shared as
willingly.
Lessons learned. There were several organizational and personal lessons learned. Key
findings from the needs assessment survey demonstrated a discrepancy in actual clinical
practices of obtaining vital signs for patients with a PCA device when compared to the policy. It
was important to learn that nurses were over documenting in regards to the frequency on some
parameters, and conversely under documenting on other requirements. In order to sustain the
gain in knowledge regarding the frequency of vital sign documentation, small, laminated cards
will be provided to the nurses on the Med/Surg unit (that can be worn on their badges) for a
quick reminder.
Documentation for the previous PCA devices was on paper (doctor orders and
documentation); the manually tracking of the previous paper documentation method made it
easier to make the drug dosage and volume totals add up because of the paper trail. The new
online documentation was supposed to allow for better tracking of narcotic usage, but the
integration of the PCA pump and the EHR was not fully understood. It would appear as though
whole narcotic syringes had gone missing because of the inconsistent documentation practices by
some nurses. The problem was a global one and could not be tracked to a few people. This raises
obvious concerns from the pharmacy director’s perspective: are nurses diverting narcotics or just
not documenting accurately?
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Change in knowledge doesn’t always produce a change in behavior. The PDSA cycle was
intended to implement small tests of change. Different andragogical approaches were used to
determine the most effective method to educate the staff nurses. Three tests of change were
planned: 1) PPT presentation on Healthstream© with post-test for introductory medication safety
education information, 2) survey about current PCA practice, and 3) a simulation experience was
planned as an interactive, hands on, active learning. Since the approval to pay nurses to come in
for the simulations was denied, simulations would need to be done during working hours and
would result in competing patient care priorities. As a result, simulations were planned to be
completed on site rather than use the local college’s simulation lab. The hospital had expected
their simulation lab to be up and running by April 2014; as of October 2014, the lab was still not
fully operational.
Failing to identify the informal leaders of the Med/Surg unit was an important personal
lesson learned. The DNP student relied heavily on support from the formal leadership of the unit
to propel the project forward. Had the informal leaders of the unit been identified early, these
nurses could have been very helpful in championing the project to encourage participation and
promote change. Another personal lesson learned was that passion about something (in this case,
medication safety), does not translate to universal buy in from others. More importantly, passion
is not enough to encourage others to be more interested in learning more about the subject.
Lastly, even with sound teaching strategies, an educator cannot change behavior alone; that
responsibility is that of the learner. According to Plutarch, “Education is not the filling of a pail,
but the lighting of a fire” (often misattributed to William Butler Yeats). This quote exemplifies
the need to find the right educational approach for the right nurse at the right time; something
that hospital organizations generally do not have the luxury of time or money to do.
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New possibilities. As previously discussed, the medication error rate per 1000 patient
days is much higher at this agency then compared to the national average. It is assumed that near
miss events are actually being categorized as medication errors. The evidence for this assumption
is in the Healthstream post-test for the medication safety course. The question asked, “If a
medication is filled wrong in the Pyxis, what type of Med Event would that fall under when you
report this safety issue in Meditech?” The options were Administration Issues, Drug Events, or
Pharmacy Issue. In addition to being a pharmacy issue, the more accurate answer to this question
is that the safety issue should be reported as a near miss (but, this was not one of the options). By
cross-referencing the medication event categories with those that are near misses, more accurate
data can be collected. When re-examining the medication event categories, there is an
opportunity to flag some of the categories as near miss events; a couple examples include:
pharmacy issues, Medication Administration Record (MAR) issues, and narcotic/count issues.
Another possibility that emerged as a result of this evidence-based change in practice
project was centered on recognizing the system factors affecting the timely documentation when
caring for patients on PCA devices. For example, when sharing the scenario development
worksheets for the simulation exercise, both the quality management and pharmacy directors
could not comment on the scenario because they both did not fully understand the nursing
workflow process involved for the required PCA documentation.
Implications. Education is not the same thing as learning (Zigmont, 2014). Furthermore,
learning (in contrast to education or ‘seat time’) has a measurable outcome in terms of better
patient outcomes, improving work environment and customer service (Zigmont, 2014). Zigmont
argues that the most efficient way to educate people is to fill a classroom, whereas the most
effective (and most expensive) method for learning is small group simulation experiences
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(2014). Learning must be a priority that comes with the appropriate investment in time and
dollars. A philosophical shift is needed to support learning in order to improve patient
satisfaction and patient outcomes. In addition, participants must have the desire to learn with the
right climate to transfer new knowledge (Dennison, 2007).
Dissemination plan. The results of the needs assessment was presented during scheduled
staff meetings on the Med/Surg unit and distributed by email for nurses who were not in
attendance. Approximately 25 nurses attended the staff meetings and were give a copy of the
results as well as a page of frequently asked questions (FAQs) regarding medication safety (see
Appendix P for the handout provided to the staff nurses). The FAQs provided an additional
opportunity to reinforce the definition of a near miss event and the importance of reporting both
systems and human issued contributing to either near misses or actual medication errors. Results
of the needs assessment and analysis of the Healthstream© post-test were also given to each
director with key lessons learned, suggestions for improvement, and strategies to overcome
obstacles.
Relation to other evidence:
Comparison to previous studies. Very few research articles were discovered on
medication errors made by nurses; most of the articles were literature reviews to determine the
scope of the problem. See Appendix Q for summary of specific articles related to medication
safety education programs that were reviewed and how they were rated.
Leufer and Cleary-Holdforth (2013) conducted a literature review to determine the extent
and severity of the problem of medication errors and the contributing factors. Medication safety
curricula should be focused on the fundamental concepts of medication administration to ensure
the highest level of safety (Leufer & Cleary-Holdforth, 2013). In addition, the complex processes

MEDICATION SAFETY

59

of prescription, calculation, constitution, checking, administration, patient assessment,
documentation, and patient medication education should be addressed in the curricula (Leufer &
Cleary-Holdforth, 2013). Extrinsic problems, such as workload, staffing ratio, skill mix, number
of patients and patient acuity involve issues outside of the nurse’s direct control (Leufer &
Cleary-Holdforth, 2013). Whereas, problems related to knowledge deficit, practice deficit, math
skills, inattention and distraction are examples of intrinsic issues within the nurse’s control
(Leufer & Cleary-Holdforth, 2013).
Previous studies presented mixed results. A randomized control trial by Lu et al., (2013)
reported that using a 60-minute PPT presentation was an effective method of providing
education as demonstrated by statistically significant increases in test scores post intervention.
Sears, Goldsworthy, and Goodman (2010) also conducted a randomized control trial and
reported fewer errors in the simulation intervention group compared to the control group
indicating that a simulation-based education method was effective in changing practice by
reducing the number of medication errors committed during the simulation exercise. Lastly,
Dennison (2007) conducted a quasi-experimental study and reported a statistically significant
increase in test scores after two 30-minutes computer modules about medication safety without a
corresponding change in behavior.
Similarities/differences. This evidence-based change in practice project encompassed
the tenets of previous studies and articles published about medication safety. Education programs
are a convenient method for disseminating information about complex system issues to a large
number of nurses. The literature consistently indicated that education programs should include
clear definitions, reporting process for medication events, the importance of disclosure, and an
overview of patient safety principles that include examples of system and human factors, as well
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as an emphasis on culture of safety philosophy and leadership commitment. The PPT and
simulation exercise for this project included definitions of near miss and medication error,
human and system factors that contribute to medication errors. In addition, knowledge level of
the pharmacokinetics of opioids (i.e. Morphine) to reduce the risk of respiratory depression with
its use in PCA devices was surveyed. Concepts of a safety culture was explored with each
director and reiterated with the Med/Surg staff to emphasize the importance of near miss
reporting. These same methods (a computer based educational self-learning module and
simulation exercises) were used in this project; however one major difference was that both
educational modalities were used sequentially to change practice and not just to evaluate an
increase in test scores.
Barriers to Implementation:
Bias. External factors were not fully considered when implementing this project and
contribute to confounding biases. The hospital continued to provide training about the PCA
pumps from “super users” and members of the NICE team independent of the strategy the DNP
student was trying to implement to improve PCA documentation. As a result, it will be difficult
to determine if the behavioral change was a result of the evidence-based change in practice
project or the educational efforts of the hospital.
Known barriers. An obstacle that could not have been anticipated was the hospital’s
selection for Level II trauma designation. The implementation plan to obtain full designation
required extensive amount of education related to trauma to prepare the entire staff in caring for
these more complex patients. In addition, The Joint Commission had a site visit in September
2014, which impeded implementation of the evidence-based change in practice project because
of the focus and attention the survey required.
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Locally held assumptions. A few assumptions were evident among the staff nurses and
the directors (pharmacy, education, quality management, Med/Surg). The staff nurses’ reported
feeling that administration makes them do certain things, they object to extra duties imposed on
them, and feel overwhelmed and resistant to change. Many shortcuts and work-arounds were
directly observed on the unit; when these issues are brought to the nurse’s attention, the response
was centered on not having enough time or resources to do their job. There was no awareness or
acknowledgement of the impact the work-arounds had on patient safety. These assumptions were
complicated by the mixed message from the administration of the hospital in that education fixes
everything. There is often a knee-jerk reaction to educate the masses, but without taking the time
to do it right and determining the root cause of the problem.
Interpretation:
There were many competing commitments during the implementation of this project. The
hospital was committed to offering mandatory trauma education due to being selected as the
local trauma center; full designation of Level II trauma status is expected in December 2014. The
quality management director was working on several other projects, the education director was
focused on coordinating the trauma education and developing the simulation lab, and the
pharmacy director was preparing for the annual Medication Error Reduction Program (MERP)
report. As a result of these competing commitments, the project could not be implemented within
the established time frame and expected outcomes could not be fully observed.
The most important aspect of the implementation plan was conducting the simulation
exercises to promote a change in practice was hindered because the simulation lab was not fully
operational within the original timeframe proposed by the hospital. There was an initial
agreement to pay the nurses to participate in the simulation activity. Original plans had the
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nurses going to the local college to use their simulation lab (until the hospital’s lab was fully
operational). The decision was then changed to have the nurses complete the simulation exercise
during working hours, despite not having the simulation lab ready.
The leadership did not agree with the need for change in terms of reducing costs
associated with medication errors. The DNP student learned in October 2014 that the population
served by the hospital is not a litigious one; the quality management director reported only one
lawsuit that resulted in a settlement of less than $100,000 in the 20 years of employment at the
hospital. Nevertheless, insights were provided into the process of PCA documentation and near
miss reporting that could help improve the system in which the nurses work.
Conclusions:
Requiring a specified amount of education about medication safety is the quickest,
easiest, and most cost effect way to address the issue; however, the outcomes do not always
demonstrate a change in behavior. Increasing awareness of the human and system factors
contributing to medication errors was an important goal to improve the system in which nurses
administer medications. Streamlining the medication events for the online reporting tool will
hopefully increase the convenience of reporting and enable more nurses to document both near
miss events and actual medication errors. The needs assessment to establish baseline PCA
knowledge clearly demonstrated an area for improvement as nurses, overall, indicated they were
only moderately comfortable with PCA devices. The intervention of combining didactic content
and a simulation activity is still useful as a means to change practice in terms of reporting more
near miss events and improving PCA documentation. A greater commitment from leadership is
necessary to sustain practice changes in order to improve patient outcomes. The DNP student
still plans to implement the simulation scenarios when the hospital’s simulation lab is operational
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(if permitted by the agency) and will re-send the needs assessment survey focusing on the
responses directly pertaining to PCA documentation. Follow up on the number of near miss
reports and PCA documentation audits will also continue.
As a county-owned, bureaucratic organization, some of the delays in implementation and
evaluation of the project were expected, although they were not fully planned for. Examples of
obstacles that were not planned for include a site visit from The Joint Commission and being
awarded a tentative Level II trauma designation. In addition, the lack of cooperation between the
department directors and the DNP student over the last several months or the project was not
expected or anticipated. The lack of information truly hindered the implementation and
evaluation of the remaining components of the project. The reasons for the lack of cooperation
and information sharing are still unclear.
There are several implications for patient care and developing health professional; both
leadership and healthcare professionals (nurses, physicians, and pharmacists) must be proactive
in identifying faulty systems and advocate for proper safeguards to be in place. Seamless
reporting of these events is the critical element in identifying complex system issues. According
to Tzeng, Yin, and Schneider, “errors need to be appreciated, understood and corrected
immediately” (2013, p. 15). Full disclosure of medication error rates, types, and circumstances is
necessary to fully appreciate the scope of the problem.
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Appendix A: Medication Events with Descriptions

Risk Module – Medication Event Options with related descriptions
12/16/13
(MEDADR) - Administration Issues:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Medication contaminated
Delayed administration
Duplicate administration
Expired Medication identified
Omission (not given)
Found Med-not taken by patient
Pt unable to retain medication
Wrong Patient
Tampering evident
Wrong Time

(MEDADDR) - Adverse Drug reaction
•
•
•
•

Adverse Reaction physical
Drug/Food Interaction
Drug/Drug Interaction
Side effect requiring additional meds

(MEDALLERG) - Adverse Drug Reaction (MEDDRUG) - Drug Events (5 Rights)
•

•

Allergy Known
Allergy Unknown

•
•
•
•
•

•
(MEDMAR) - MAR Issues
•
•
•
•

•

Medication D/C'ed still on MAR
Duplicate order on MAR
Incorrect instruction
Incorrect Transcription of Med
Medication ordered, not on MAR

(MEDOVERR) - Override Issues
•

•

Emergency event
Medication ordered, not on MAR

Wrong concentration
Wrong Drug
Wrong Dose
Wrong Form
Wrong Route
Wrong rate of administration

(MEDNARC) - Narcotic / Count Issues
•
•

Count incorrect
Waste incorrect

(MEDPHA) - Pharmacy Issues
•
•

Expired medication found
Pyxis fill error
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Appendix B: Medication Safety Module
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Appendix C: Additional slides from patient safety/risk notifications training course:

Patient
atient Safet
afety
ety/Risk
isk
Notif
Notificat
ifications
ications
AKA “incident report” or “occurrence report”
Was previously known as Quality Review Report (QRR)

From paper to electronic

Risk Management Program
The purpose of a Risk Management program is to
identify risks of harm to patients, visitors or staff,
implement strategies to reduce the risk, and manage the
potential outcome following any unusual occurrence
(including managing, with the Claims Management
Department, any claims or lawsuits that might result).
One of the ways to identify potential or actual risks is
through an Occurrence Reporting System.
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Occurrence Reporting
Assists in identifying care or safety conditions that may
result in an injury to a patient or staff.
Assists in monitoring frequency and severity of
occurrences, identifying opportunities for quality
improvement and/or potential legal liability and
implementing corrective action.

Definition of Occurrence
Any unanticipated event that deviates
from regular hospital operations.

Injury or harm may or may not result
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Types of Occurrences
 Error: An unintended event or act. This can be
something that was done or something that should have
been done but wasn’t.
 Near Miss: An event that was “caught” and caused no
harm, but for which a recurrence carries a significant
chance of harm.
 Hazardous Condition: Any set of circumstances which
significantly increase the likelihood of a serious adverse
outcome.

8 of 30
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Appendix D: Medication Safety Scenario Development Worksheets
Appendix D1: PCA Care and Management: Documentation Change in Provider
IDENTIFIED PROBLEM/SCENARIO TOPIC
DESIRED CHANGE/OVERALL GOAL
MEDICATION SAFETY REGARDING PCA USE ON A ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION
MED/SURG ACUTE CARE FLOOR.
ASSESSMENT OF COMPLICATIONS
CASE SUMMARY
CRITICAL PERFORMANCE ELEMENTS
PROPER DOCUMENTATION DURING CHANGE OF
POST OP PATIENT WITH A PCA.
PROVIDERS WITH TWO NURSES

CASE FLOW (15-20 MINUTE SIMULATION TIME MAXIMUM)
INITIATION OF SCENARIO
FIRST FRAME
During change of shift: (Change in
1. Performs hand hygiene,
provider)
introduces self, identifies the

patient and explains purpose. 
2. PCA check at the bedside;
3. RN asks for a 2nd RN to help
4. Brings WOW to bedside
SECOND FRAME
For change in provider:
1. Completes documentation under PCA Change/Co-signature required in
Meditech.
2. Verify PCA SETTINGS (with second independent verification):
a. Clicks the “Yes” box
3. GENERAL:
a. NOTES the number of injections, number of attempts, amount of drug in
(ml) and (mg/mcg).
4. PROVIDER CHANGES: Checks the boxes for:
a. “pump cleared”
b. “change in care provider”
5. COMMENT as needed

THIRD FRAME
Clears the pump in two places:
1. Patient history (Zooms to 24
hours) and
2. Volume infused

FOURTH FRAME
Documents in the IV spreadsheet
1. Enter intake in mls


SCENARIO END POINT: ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION BY BOTH NURSES

D
E
B
R
I
E
F
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Appendix D: Medication Safety Scenario Development Worksheets
Appendix D2: PCA Care and Management: Documentation when PCA is discontinued
IDENTIFIED PROBLEM/SCENARIO TOPIC
DESIRED CHANGE/OVERALL GOAL
MEDICATION SAFETY REGARDING PCA USE ON A ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION
MED/SURG ACUTE CARE FLOOR.
ASSESSMENT OF COMPLICATIONS
CASE SUMMARY
CRITICAL PERFORMANCE ELEMENTS
DOCUMENTATION DURING DISCONTINUING
POST OP PATIENT WITH A PCA.
PCA THERAPY WITH TWO NURSES
CASE FLOW (20 MINUTE SIMULATION TIME MAXIMUM)
INITIATION OF SCENARIO
FIRST FRAME
Physician just completed rounds
1. Performs hand hygiene,
and wrote an order to
introduces self, identifies the

discontinue the PCA and start
patient and explains purpose. 
oral analgesics
2. PCA check at the bedside;
3. RN asks for a 2nd RN to help
4. Brings WOW to bedside
SECOND FRAME
1. Completes documentation under PCA Change/Co-signature required in
Meditech.
2. GENERAL:
a. NOTES the number of injections, number of attempts, amount of drug in
(ml) and (mg/mcg).
3. PROVIDER CHANGES: Checks the boxes for:
a. “PCA discontinued”
4. PCA DRUG WASTED:
a. Documents amount of drug wasted when syringe changed
b. Includes 2.6 ml for drug wasted in the tubing
c. Waste does NOT need to be double documented in the Pyxis
5. COMMENT as needed
THIRD FRAME
Clears the pump in two places:
1. Patient history (Zooms to 24
hours) and
2. Volume infused

FOURTH FRAME
Documents in the IV spreadsheet
1. Enter intake in mls


SCENARIO END POINT: ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION BY BOTH NURSES

D
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Appendix D: Medication Safety Scenario Development Worksheets
Appendix D3: PCA Care and Management: Documentation when new PCA syringe is
administered
IDENTIFIED PROBLEM/SCENARIO TOPIC
DESIRED CHANGE/OVERALL GOAL
MEDICATION SAFETY REGARDING PCA USE ON A ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION
MED/SURG ACUTE CARE FLOOR.
ASSESSMENT OF COMPLICATIONS
CASE SUMMARY
CRITICAL PERFORMANCE ELEMENTS
DOCUMENTATION DURING SYRINGE CHANGE
POST OP PATIENT WITH A PCA.
WITH TWO NURSES

CASE FLOW (20 MINUTE SIMULATION TIME MAXIMUM)
INITIATION OF SCENARIO
FIRST FRAME
Patient presses call light saying
1. Performs hand hygiene,
the IV pump is beeping: (Change
introduces self, identifies the

syringe of medication)
patient and explains purpose. 
2. PCA check at the bedside;
3. RN asks for a 2nd RN to help
4. Brings WOW to bedside
SECOND FRAME
1. Completes documentation under PCA Setting Assessment (after new syringe is
scanned)  Verified at the bedside with second nurse
a. Verify PCA Medication (Morphine)
b. Infusion mode (Continuous, Intermittent, Continuous with Intermittent,
Other)
c. Continuous rate (mg/hr)
d. PCA intermittent dose (mg)
e. Lockout interval (minutes)
f. Max analgesia in 4 hours (mg)
THIRD FRAME
1. Completes documentation under PCA Change/Co-signature required in
Meditech.
2. Verify PCA SETTINGS (with second independent verification):
a. Clicks the “Yes” box
3. GENERAL:
a. NOTES the number of injections, number of attempts, amount of drug in
(ml) and (mg/mcg).
4. PROVIDER CHANGES: Checks the boxes for:
a. “pump cleared”
b. “syringe changed”
5. PCA DRUG WASTED:
a. Documents amount of drug left in the syringe/wasted when syringe
changed (include 2.6 ml if tubing is changed)
6. COMMENT as needed

MEDICATION SAFETY
FOURTH FRAME
Clears the pump in two places:
1. Patient history (Zooms to 24
hours) and
2. Volume infused
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FIFTH FRAME
Documents in the IV spreadsheet
1. Enter intake in mls


SCENARIO END POINT: ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION BY BOTH NURSES
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Appendix D: Medication Safety Scenario Development Worksheets
Appendix D4: PCA Care and Management: Documentation when PCA settings are
changed
IDENTIFIED PROBLEM/SCENARIO TOPIC
DESIRED CHANGE/OVERALL GOAL
MEDICATION SAFETY REGARDING PCA USE ON A ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION
MED/SURG ACUTE CARE FLOOR.
ASSESSMENT OF COMPLICATIONS
CASE SUMMARY
CRITICAL PERFORMANCE ELEMENTS
DOCUMENTATION DURING PCA SETTINGS
POST OP PATIENT WITH A PCA.
CHANGE WITH TWO NURSES

CASE FLOW (20 MINUTE SIMULATION TIME MAXIMUM)
INITIATION OF SCENARIO
FIRST FRAME
Patient presses call light saying
1. Performs hand hygiene,
increased pain levels not being
introduces self, identifies the

relieved by PCA: (Change PCA
patient and explains purpose. 
2. PCA check at the bedside;
settings)
3. RN asks for a 2nd RN to help
4. Brings WOW to bedside
SECOND FRAME
1. Completes documentation under PCA Setting Change Assessment  Verified at
the bedside with second nurse
a. Verify PCA Medication (Morphine)
b. Infusion mode (Continuous, Intermittent, Continuous with Intermittent,
Other)
c. Continuous rate (mg/hr)
d. PCA intermittent dose (mg)
e. Lockout interval (minutes)
f. Max analgesia in 4 hours (mg)
THIRD FRAME
1. Completes the intervention of “PCA initiation monitoring assessment” (when
increasing the dose or rate; do not complete this if dose is being decreased)
2. Adds the “PCA change monitoring” intervention and documents according to
policy:
a. VS, pain, EtCO2 and/or O2 sat Q15 min x 2 (after dose increase)
b. Sedation level
D
FOURTH FRAME
FIFTH FRAME
E
Clears the pump in two places:
Documents in the IV spreadsheet
B
1. Enter intake in mls
1. Patient history (Zooms to 24
R

hours) and
I
2. Volume infused
E
F

SCENARIO END POINT: ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION BY BOTH NURSES
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Appendix E: Pro Forma/Operating Statement

Operating Statement:

Amount
Requested

Total

REVENUE:
No revenue will be generated for this project; rather, a cost
Not Applicable N/A
savings will be realized by preventing avoidable adverse drug
events.
EXPENSES:
PERSONNEL:
A. RN coordinator (DNP student)
+$19,200
$25,920
** Waived Volunteer (300 hrs x $64 + benefits ~ 35%)
+$6,720 benefits
B. Pharmacy Director + benefits
+$560
$756
(# ~8 meetings x 1 hr @~$70/hr salary + benefits ~ 35%)
+$196 (benefits)
C. Education Director + benefits
+$560
$756
(# ~8 meetings x 1 hr @~$70/hr salary + benefits ~ 35%)
+$196 (benefits)
D. Quality Management Director + benefits
+$560
$756
(# ~8 meetings x 1 hr @~$70/hr salary + benefits ~ 35%)
+$196 (benefits)
E. Simulation technician
+$1,800
$2,430
(60 hrs x $30/hr) + benefits
+$630 (benefits)
F. Nursing salary for attending in-service and simulation
+$18,000
$24,300
100 nurses x 3 hrs x $60/hr + benefits
+$6,300 (benefits)
G. IT specialist to program TEST patients in Meditech
$300
$300
Subtotal Personnel Expenses:
OPERATING EXPENSES:
Employee incentives
(Meal vouchers/Starbucks gift card to complete needs
assessment) $10/nurse ($10 x 100 nurses)
Printed educational hand out materials
Simulation costs: Lab usage for 4 hours (includes set up, tear
down, debriefing, hi-fidelity manikin, rooms)
25 sessions x $150/sessions (flat rate)
Supplies (PCA pump tubing, syringes, IV solutions, saline
flushes, simulated medication tablets)
Subtotal Operating Expenses:
Grand Total:

$55,218

$1,000

$1,000

$400

$400

$3750

$3,750

$2000

$2,000
$7,150
$62,368
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Appendix F: Cost/Benefit Analysis

Costs
Personnel salaries:
DNP student coordinator
(waived)
Pharmacy, Education,
Quality Management
Directors
Simulation technician
IT program specialist
Nursing staff salary to
attend in-service
Employee incentives:
Meal vouchers
Starbucks gift cards
Printed educational material:
Handouts
Simulation costs:
Manikin usage
Wear and tear on manikin
Necessary supplies (PCA
tubing/syringes etc)
Total:

$55, 218

Benefits
Preventing a medication
error and avoiding associated
costs:
Direct/indirect costs
Increases in medical
professional liability
Legal settlement costs
Extended length of stay
Additional supply costs

Potential
savings of
$487,690 per
medication
error avoided
(specifically
related to
narcotics)

$1000
$400
$2000

$62,368

$487,690

Payback time is approximately one month after fully implementing the medication safety
education program.
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Appendix G: Responsibility Matrix

Task:

Online
reporting for
medication
errors/near
miss events

Needs
Assessment
specific to the
care and
management
of patients
with a PCA
Medication
Safety
Learning
Module

Simulation
Exercise

Project Team: Medication Safety Education Module
Qual
DNP
Mg't IT
Pharm
Subtask:
student Dir
spec Dir
Implement online risk
notification module
R
Redefine dictionaries for
medication event
categories and
subcategories
S
R
S
S
Create education/training
plan for roll out
S
R
Develop content for
module for overview of
medication safety
R
S
Develop survey on
current knowledge and
comfort level with PCAs
R
S
S
Send out link to M/S
nurses
R
Collect and analyze
results of survey
R
Distribute survey results
Develop content for
module (specific content)
Develop pre/post test
Peer review feedback
from staff nurse III's
Analyze results from
pre/post test
Revise content based on
results as needed
Write clear and directed
learning objectives
Develop realistic
scenario
Pilot and validate
scenario

R=Responsible
S=Supports/assists

Educ
Educ SNM/S
Dir
III
Dir

S

S

S

S
S

R
R
R

S
S

S

R

S

R
R
R

S

S

R

S

R

S

S

S
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Appendix H: Medication Safety Survey about PCA use
The purpose of this survey is to enable a Doctoral student (in Nursing Practice DNP) to
complete a needs assessment and collect baseline information about nurses' current
knowledge of PCA use and maintenance in terms of medication safety.
This survey should take 4 1/2 minutes to complete. Your time and cooperation are greatly
appreciated. The survey will be open until 4/10/14.
Demographic Information
Please indicate how many years of nursing experience you have (at any hospital or
healthcare agency) and how long you have worked on Med/Surg 3 (specifically) at this
hospital.
1. How many years of nursing experience do you have?
a. 0-2 years
b. 3-5 years
c. 6-10 years
d. More than 10 year
2. How long have you worked as a registered nurse on Med/Surg 3 at NMC?
a. 0-2 years
b. 3-5 years
c. 6-10 years
d. More than 10 year
Baseline data
3. How comfortable are you working with patient controlled analgesia (PCA) devices?
a. Not very comfortable
b. Moderately comfortable
c. Very comfortable
4. How familiar are you with the hospital's PCA policy?
a. Not very familiar
b. Moderately familiar
c. Very familiar
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Implementing the PCA policy
5. What topics do you include when teaching the patient/family about the PCA use?
Select all that apply.
a. About the actual medication (i.e. peak, onset, duration)
b. Frequency of assessment required
c. Side effects to report
d. When to press the button
e. Who can press the button
f. Use of the PCA
g. Other (please specify what additional information you teach your patient)
6. How frequently do you monitor a patient with a PCA on initiation? Select all that
apply for each relevant parameter. Please note: Only answer for when you are
INITIATING a new PCA.
Q15
N/A
Q30
Q1
Q1
Q2
Q2
min
min
hour hour hours hours
x2
x2
x2
x2
Oxygen saturation
Respiration Rate
Vital signs (HR/BP)
Pain/ Sedation level
Other (please specify which parameter and how frequently) [free text]
7. How frequently do you monitor a patient with a PCA after each dose increase? Select
all that apply for each relevant parameter. Please note: Only answer for when you
have INCREASED THE DOSE on the PCA.
N/A
Q15
Q30
Q1
Q1
Q2
Q2
min
min
hour hour hours hours
x2
x2
x2
x2
Oxygen saturation
Respiration Rate
Vital signs (HR/BP)
Pain/ Sedation level
Other (please specify which parameter and how frequently) [free text]
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8. How frequently do you monitor a patient for the duration of PCA therapy? Select all
that apply for each relevant parameter. Please note: Only answer for what you
monitor DURING PCA therapy.
Q15
Q30
Q1
N/A
Q1
Q2
Q2
min
min
hour hour hours hours
x2
x2
x2
x2
Oxygen saturation
Respiration Rate
Vital signs (HR/BP)
Pain/ Sedation level
Other (please specify which parameter and how frequently) [free text]
9. When do PCA settings/procedures require verification by 2 licensed staff (i.e.
witness/cosign)? Select all that apply.
a. When the PCA is initially set up
b. When medication dose or limit has changed
c. At end of shift
d. When caregivers are changed
e. When the medication syringe is replaced
f. When the PCA is discontinued
g. When the PCA pump is cleared at every handoff
h. During patient assessment
i. When any medication is wasted (including the tubing)
j. Prior to transporting patient off the floor
10. When does the PCA pump need to be cleared (i.e. zeroed)? [free text]
11. When clearing the pump, which two places need to be zeroed? Select all that apply.
a. Patient history
b. Volume infused
c. Dose request setup
d. Drug event history
12. During your shift, the patient had 4 attempts, 4 injections, and received a total of 16
mg/(16 ml) of Morphine. When changing providers, what must you and the
oncoming RN document before you can leave the unit? Select all that apply.
a. Document under the PCA setting Change Intervention
b. Document under the PCA CoSignature
c. Required Intervention
d. Document the total amount of drug infused in the IV spreadsheet
e. Document on the PCA Initiation Monitoring Intervention
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13. In terms of question #12, when this documentation is taking place (changing
providers), where are you and the oncoming nurse?
a. At the nurses station
b. At the patient's bedside
c. In the hallway
d. In the charting room
14. When do you document the additional 2.6 ml (for the volume of the tubing) on the
IV spreadsheet? Select all that apply.
a. When the PCA is discontinued
b. Every time the pump is cleared (zeroed)
c. When the tubing is changed
d. Every time a new syringe is started
15. When is the most common time of the day for a patient to experience respiratory
depression?
a. 6am12pm (0600 - 1200)
b. 12pm6pm (1200 - 1800)
c. 6pm12am (midnight) (1800 - 0000)
d. 12am (midnight) to 6am (0000 - 0600)
16. The most important predictor of respiratory depression in patients receiving
intravenous (IV) opioid analgesics in the hospital setting is:
a. Respiratory rate
b. Patient-reported pain intensity
c. Sedation level
d. Blood pressure
17. How do you know if a patient has a higher risk for respiratory depression? [free
text]
18. How do you know if a patient is opiate naïve? [free text]
19. What are your biggest obstacles/challenges when caring for patients with a PCA?
[free text]
20. Please include your name and email address if you wish to be entered into a raffle
for a variety of gift baskets. Responses will be aggregated anonymously; your
individual responses will be kept confidential. I promise.
Name:
Email Address:
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Appendix I: Gap Analysis

Current Practice

Action Steps

Desired Practices
(Goals)

Where are we now?

How do we plan to move
forward?
• Define the gap
• Delineate between near miss
and an actual medication error
• Implement new risk module for
online reporting
• Train staff on how to use new
reporting process
• Educate clinical staff on
definition of near miss event
and why it is important to report
•
• Determine the scope of the
problem
• Understand workflow process
of nurses caring for patients
with a PCA
o interview nurses
o provide just in time
education
o conduct needs
assessment
o plan simulation activity
to high light correct
documentation
procedures
• Obtain baseline data regarding
current knowledge of opioid
adverse reactions and side
effects
• Provide education through a
simulation activity to increase
awareness of ADRs and how
to report them.

Where would we like
to be?
Increase the number of
near miss reports by
10% in the first 4
months and by 30%
after 8 months.

There is a “huge gap in near
miss reporting”

1/3 of nurse are not
documenting correctly on
the PCA intervention
screens and IV flow sheet

Increase number of ADRs
related to opioids
(Morphine)

>70% of nurses will be
compliant with current
PCA documentation
requirements by the
end of the project

Reduce the number of
ADRs related to
opioids by 20%

MEDICATION SAFETY

95
Appendix J: Gantt Chart
Medication Safety Education Program
2013
Oct

Establish MOU
agreement
Online reporting tool

Nov

2014
Dec

Jan

Feb

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

ar

o

o

Plan staff training
Develop training PPT on
Healthstream
Develop introductory
PPT about med safety
for Healthstream
Develop post-test

ar

ar

ar

ar

ar

ar

o

o
M/C

Feb

Analyze test results

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Mar

Apr

o

o
M
Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

ar
M

Analyze post-test results

Administer safety module

May

ar

Go live with Risk Module

Determine scope of
problem - review QRRs
FY2013 (July-Jun)
Develop content for
series of self-learning
modules on med safety
Develop pre/post test
Peer review education
module and test

Apr

began in April 2013 and final approval was obtained in September 2013

Redefine dictionary

Medication Safety
Module

Mar

Oct

Nov

Dec

o

o

o

Jan

Feb

Mar

o

o

o
M

x
May

Jun

C

Jul

Aug

x

x

x

C
C

o

o

x

o

o

did not complete

x

did not complete

x

o
M

o
o

did not complete

x
x
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Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

May

Jun

Jul

Disseminate findings

o

x/C

Plan next steps

o

x

x

May

Jun

Jul

o

x

x

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

o
M/C

Collect and analyze
results

o
M/C

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Determine exact
compliance issue

Mar

Apr

x

x
Aug

x

o

Develop clear objectives
Complete scenario
development worksheets
drafts for peer review

x/C
Sep

Oct

x/C
x/C

o
M

x

x

x/C

Develop actual scenario

o

x

x

Pilot test the scenario

o

x

x

Validate the scenario

o
o
M

x

x

Implement scenario

Original Plan (o)
Milestone (M)

Dec

o

Send survey to M/S
nurses

KEY:

Nov

o

Conduct staff interviews
Develop needs
assessment

Simulation exercise
for PCAs

Apr

Actual timeline (x)
Completed (C)
Agency responsibility (ar)

did not complete
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Appendix K: Post Simulation Evaluation/Reflection Questions

1. The simulation experience was relevant to my clinical practice.
a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Neutral
d. Disagree
e. Strongly disagree
2. I was able to identify the patient’s primary problem.
a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Neutral
d. Disagree
e. Strongly disagree
3. I was able to make clinical decision and determine appropriate interventions.
a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Neutral
d. Disagree
e. Strongly disagree
4. The simulation experience seemed realistic.
a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Neutral
d. Disagree
e. Strongly disagree
5. The simulation experience expanded my awareness of PCA documentation
requirements.
a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Neutral
d. Disagree
e. Strongly disagree
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6. The debriefing/reflection session allowed me to explore my decision-making skills.
a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Neutral
d. Disagree
e. Strongly disagree
7. The debriefing/reflection session provided valuable feedback.
a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Neutral
d. Disagree
e. Strongly disagree
8. The overall experience helped me to identify areas of practice where I am strong.
a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Neutral
d. Disagree
e. Strongly disagree
9. The overall experience helped me to identify areas where I need more practice.
a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Neutral
d. Disagree
e. Strongly disagree
10. How long did it take you to engage or immerse into the simulation?
a. Immediately
b. 2-5 minutes
c. 6-10 minutes
d. Never fully engaged
e. Other [FREE TEXT]

11. List one way your practice will change as a result of this simulation experience.
[FREE TEXT].
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External origin (Marcrosystem)

Internal origin (Microsystem)

Appendix L: SWOT analysis
Helpful
Strengths:
Have support from Pharmacy, Education
and Quality Management.
Expertise of nursing faculty in various
teaching methodologies.
Increase reports of near misses help to build
a safer healthcare system.
New simulation suite is being built in the
education department.
Simulation is a formative process.
Simulation is a safe-environment to
experience a “mistake”.
Scenarios enhance realism and provide
excellent active learning opportunities.
A simulation-learning environment helps the
participant change mental models through
the debriefing process.
Safe and effective.
Opportunities:
Simulation scenarios can be published for
PCA training/in-service.
Medication module can be marketed.
Conduct a needs assessment to determine
obstacles and barriers of PCA
documentation and assessment in order to
address the root cause of the problem.

Harmful
Weaknesses:
Simulation resources need to be fully
implemented.
Need access to enough PCA pumps for
training purposes.
Nurses would need to be compensated for
their time to attend the simulation
experience.
Coordination of time/schedules to offer
simulation experience.
Nurse resistance to learning a new practice
policy.
Nurses may not fully understand purpose of
simulation-based learning.
Need administrative support (from
individual nursing unit managers/directors).
Dependent on outside vendors to complete
simulation suite in the established
timeframe.
Threats:
Budget for simulation is not fully
established.
Scheduling simulation experiences within
nurses busy work schedules.
May incur overtime to have participation in
simulation scenario.
Nurses may feel threatened or fear poor
performance will be reflected on evaluation.
Nurses may not want to participate in
simulation experience.
Nurses may not want to complete the
medication safety self-learning module.
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Appendix M: Business Plan Proposal – Presentation of Options
Presentation Of Options
The status quo. If there is no change in the current practice of caring for patients with
PCAs, the poor practice issues are likely to continue. These practices pose a huge liability for the
hospital by increasing the risk for medication errors and patient harm, which results in litigation
and settlement. From a macrosystem perspective, the hospital may face fines and penalties from
licensing bodies, regulatory and accreditation agencies in addition to poor performance scores on
patient satisfaction surveys.
The preferred solution. The proposed solution is to implement a tailored education
program to address the obstacles and barriers preventing nurses from adhering to the PCA policy
with 100% compliance. In order to tackle the specific needs of the staff, a pre and post survey
will be conducted to assess current practice and knowledge of frequency of assessments and
types of assessments (pain, sedation, respiratory) required. An education module through
Healthstream about medication safety from a system perspective, defining a medication error,
ADE, and near miss event, and introducing the tenets of just culture is the first step. Expected
results include following policy, documenting correctly, performing timely patient assessments
and consistently completing independent verifications when required. There is multidisciplinary
support for the education program from the pharmacy director, education director, quality
management director, and the chief nursing officer.
The alternate solution. An alternative approach is to provide the education module only
related to PCA safety to all nurses. However, this solution does not address the root cause of the
nurses inadequate documentation related to PCA use. It is more expensive to repeat the
education to all staff rather than collecting data on the obstacles and barriers facing the nurses to
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comply with the policy, specific education/interventions can be tailored to improve effectiveness
of the educational program.
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Appendix N: Return on Investment and Break Even Analysis
Return on Investment:
Return on Investment (ROI) =

Gain (Savings) $1,628,760 – Cost $62,368
Cost $62,368
ROI (Direct costs) = 25.12%

Return on Investment (ROI) =

Gain (Savings) $1,928,760 – Cost $62,368
Cost $62,368
ROI (Direct + Indirect Costs) = 29.9%
LOGIC:
• Annual cost for preventable ADE in payer costs = $600,000
• If 50% of preventable ADEs are related to injectable medications, then
annual cost = $300,000
• Annual MPL cost from injectable medications = $72,000
• Therefore, annual costs for ADE’s related to injectable medications =
$372,000
• Multiple by 0.33% (probability of ADE being related to narcotics) =
$122,760 is the total annual costs for ADEs related to narcotics.
• Legal settlement costs = $376,500 per case
• A conservative assumption of 4 occurrences/year, places the total cost of
legal fees to $1,506,000
• Add the legal fees to the annual costs for narcotic ADEs = $1,628,760
• If indirect costs are included, we can add an additional conservative estimate
of $75,000 per event ($300,000), for a grand total $1,928,760

Break-Even Analysis (direct and indirect cost of ADE):
Quantity (Q) =
Quantity (Q) =

Fixed Cost (FC)
Price (P) per event– Variable Cost (VC)
FC = $62,368
P= $487,690 – VC (unknown)

Q = 0.13
A return on investment can be realized one month after implementing the
medication safety education program.
LOGIC:
• Price per event = $122,760 is the total annual costs for ADEs
related to narcotics divided by 4 events = $30,690.
• Plus the cost of the medication error/ADE itself = $5,500
• Plus the conservative estimate of indirect costs/event = $75,000
• Plus legal settlement costs of $376,500/event
• Grand total per event = $487,690
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Appendix O: Selected Results of Needs Assessment
Question #3:

How comfortable are you working with patient controlled analgesia (PCA)
devices?
Not very comfortable
Moderately
comfortable
Very comfortable

Question #4:
How familiar are you with the hospital's PCA policy?

Not very familiar
Moderately
familiar
Very familiar
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Question #6:

How frequently do you monitor a patient with a PCA on initiation? Select all that
apply for each relevant parameter. Please note: Only answer for when you are
INITIATING a new PCA.

How frequently do you monitor a patient with a PCA on initiation? Select all that
apply for each relevant parameter. Please note: Only answer for when you are
INITIATING a new PCA.
35
30
Q15min x2

25

Q30min x2

20

Q1hour x2

15

Q1hour

10

Q2hours x2

5

Q2hours

0

Not
Applicable

Oxygen Saturation Respiration Rate

Vital Signs (heart
rate/blood
pressure)

Pain/Sedation
Level
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Question #7:
How frequently do you monitor a patient with a PCA after each dose increase? Select
all that apply for each relevant parameter. Please note: Only answer for when you
have INCREASED THE DOSE on the PCA.

How frequently do you monitor a patient with a PCA after each dose increase?
Select all that apply for each relevant parameter. Please note: Only answer for
when you have INCREASED THE DOSE on the PCA.

30
25

Q15min x2

20

Q30min x2
Q1hour x2

15
Q1hour

10

Q2hours x2

5

Q2hours

0

Not
applicable

Oxygen Saturation

Respiration Rate

Vital Signs (heart
rate/blood
pressure)

Pain/Sedation
Level
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Question #8:
How frequently do you monitor a patient for the duration of PCA therapy? Select all
al
that apply for each relevant parameter. Please note: Only answer for what you
monitor DURING PCA therapy.

How frequently do you monitor a patient for the duration of PCA therapy? Select
all that apply for each relevant parameter. Please note: Only answer for what you
monitor DURING PCA therapy.

18
16
Q15min x2

14

Q30min x2

12

Q1hour x2

10

Q1hour

8

Q2hours x2

6

Q2hours

4

Not
applicable

2
0
Oxygen Saturation

Respiration Rate

Vital Signs (heart Pain/Sedation Level
rate/blood pressure)
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Question #9:

When do PCA settings/procedures require verification by 2 licensed staff (i.e. witness/cowitness/co-sign)?
Select all that apply.
Answer Options
When the PCA is initially set up
When medication dose or limit has
changed
At end of shift
When caregivers are changed
When the medication syringe is
replaced
When the PCA is discontinued
When the PCA pump is cleared at every
handoff
During patient assessment
When any medication is wasted
(including the tubing)
Prior to transporting patient off the floor

Response Percent

Response Count

100.0%

11

100.0%

11

90.9%
100.0%

10
11

100.0%

11

100.0%

11

100.0%

11

0.0%

0

100.0%

11

36.4%

4

answered question
skipped question

11
10

Question #11:
When clearing the pump, which two places need to be zeroed? Select all
that apply.
120.0%
100.0%
80.0%
60.0%
40.0%
20.0%
0.0%
Patient history

Volume infused

Dose request setup Drug event history
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Question #12:

During your shift, the patient had 4 attempts, 4 injections, and received a
total of 16 mg/(16 ml) of Morphine. When changing providers, what must
you and the oncoming RN document before you can leave the unit? Select
all that apply.
120.0%
100.0%
80.0%
60.0%
40.0%
20.0%
0.0%
Document under the Document under the Document the total
amount of drug
PCA setting Change PCA Co-Signature
infused in the IV
Required
Intervention
spreadsheet
Intervention

Document on the
PCA Initiation
Monitoring
Intervention

Question #13:
In terms of question #12, when this documentation is taking place (changing
providers), where are you and the oncoming nurse?

At the nurses station
At the patient's
bedside
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Question #15:

When is the most common time of the day for a patient to experience
respiratory depression?

6am-12pm
1200)

(0600-

12pm-6pm
1800)

(1200-

6pm-12am (midnight)
0000)

(1800-

12am (midnight) to 6am
0600)

(0000-

Question #16:
The most important predictor of respiratory depression in patients receiving
intravenous (IV) opioid analgesics in the hospital setting is:
Respiratory rate

Patient-reported pain
intensity
Sedation level

Blood pressure
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Appendix P: Staff Meeting Presentation Handout
PCA Care and Management: Results from the Survey

Expected frequency of
monitoring per policy:
Vital signs

Upon initiating
PCA therapy
Q15 min x2
Q30 min x2
Q1 hour x2
Then Q2 hours

With any dose
increase
Q15 min x2

Duration of
PCA therapy

Respiratory rate only
Pain and sedation levels

Q2 hours
Q15 min x2
Q15 min x2
Q2 hours
Q30 min x2
Q1 hour x2
Then Q2 hours
Q15 min x2
Q15 min x2
Q2 hours
ETCO2 and/or O2 sats
Q30 min x2
Q1 hour x2
Then Q2 hours
Table A: Expected frequency of monitoring vital signs per policy and PCA orders
#6. Upon initiating PCA
Q15
Q30
therapy (numbers in red min
min
are incorrect)
x2
x2
Oxygen saturation
100% 50%
Respiration Rate
100% 42%
Vital signs (HR/BP)
100% 45%
Pain/ Sedation level
90%
36%
Table B: Survey responses for question #6

Q1
hour
x2
58%
50%
45%
45%

Q1
Q2
hour hours
x2
17% 17%
8%
17%
9%
9%
27% 18%

Q2
N/A
hours

#7. With any dose
Q15
Q30
increase (numbers in red min
min
are incorrect)
x2
x2
Oxygen saturation
83%
42%
Respiration Rate
83%
42%
Vital signs (HR/BP)
82%
45%
Pain/ Sedation level
75%
33%
Table C: Survey responses for question #7

Q1
hour
x2
33%
33%
36%
25%

Q1
Q2
hour hours
x2
8%
8%
8%
9%
9%
8%
17% 9%

Q2
N/A
hours

33%
25%
27%
27%

25%
25%
27%
25%

0%
0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%
0%

#8. During PCA therapy Q15
Q30 Q1
Q1
Q2
Q2
N/A
(numbers in red are
min
min
hour hour hours hours
incorrect)
x2
x2
x2
x2
Oxygen saturation
8%
8%
8%
17% 8%
92%
0%
Respiration Rate
10%
10% 10% 20% 10%
90%
0%
Vital signs (HR/BP)
11%
11% 11% 22% 11%
89%
0%
Pain/ Sedation level
9%
9%
9%
18% 9%
91%
0%
Table D: Survey responses for question #8
Barbara Durham, MSN, RN, CNE, DNP-c

Medication Safety

111
Appendix P: Staff Meeting Presentation Handout
Patient Controlled Analgesia:

Documentation on PCA’s should be done in real time at the bedside. Both nurses should
actually see the number of doses given, number of attempts and amount of drug infused
before clearing the pump. Nurses should not try to rely on memory to document this ‘after
the fact’. This is documented on the “Co-Signature Intervention” screen in PCS.

Always ZOOM to 24 hours when clearing pump with each syringe and care provider
change. To get the most accurate totals and to ensure consistency.

PCA Waste
For PCA Waste ONLY you do not need to double document waste in Pyxis. PCS Meditech
documentation is sufficient. Include the 2.6 ml anytime you are discarding the tubing
(when the PCA is D/C’ed or the tubing needs to be changed).

The most important indicator of respiratory depression in patients receiving intravenous
(IV) opioid analgesics in the hospital setting is actually level of consciousness.

Higher risk for respiratory depression occurs between midnight and 6am because of the
tendency to let patients rest and not disturb them.

Opiate naïve patients are those who don’t take a lot of pain medications routinely. Also,
patients who are older are more susceptible to adverse effects because of changes in
pharmacokinetics.

Barbara Durham, MSN, RN, CNE, DNP-c
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Appendix P: Staff Meeting Presentation Handout
Did you know? Medication Safety FAQs

Question: What is a medication error?
Answer: A medication error can simply be defined as an actual or potential event, which
may be preventable, and can lead to patient harm.
Question: What is a near miss event?
Answer: Making an error in the preparation of medication for a patient, by intercepting or
recognizing the error before it reaches the patient is an example of a near miss event.
Question: Why is it important to report a near miss event?
Answer: It is important to report these types of errors because of many reasons. 1) It is
likely a “system” problem. 2) Someone else can make the same mistake, but maybe, this
time it reaches the patient.
Question: What are examples of system problems?
Answer: Environmental factors such as poor lighting, noise levels, and equipment failure
all contribute the increased incidence of medication errors. Also, medication related topics
such look alike-sound alike (LASA) medications, similar packaging and labels for
medications impact the accuracy of medication administration. Sometimes, orientation
about the policies and procedures for medication administration was inadequate or
insufficient training with the medication delivery system or barcoding/scanning
technology was received. In addition, personnel issues such as heavy workload, high
patient/nurse ratios, lack of staff or presence of new staff nurses produces an unsafe
environment within which the nurse works. Lastly, technology, lack of clinical decision
support features, and equipment failures are more examples of system problems that
contribute to medication errors.
Question: What are examples of human problems?
Answer: Communication issues contribute to medication errors if physician orders are not
clearly understood, or not questioned when appropriate. Process issues such as
distractions and interruptions (such as events on the unit, patient needs, demands from
coworkers) can affect the provider’s ability to focus on the task of administering
medications. The experience of the nurse was a factor in avoiding medication errors; lack of
experience was a likely contributing factor to explain deviations from policies, procedures,
and protocol that resulted in a medication error. Lack of knowledge related to
pharmacology and math calculation skills was linked to more medication errors. Poor
understanding the equipment, such as IV infusion pumps, added to problem of medication
errors. Nurses who multi-task or prepare medications in advance could predispose them to
making errors.

Barbara Durham, MSN, RN, CNE, DNP-c
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Appendix P: Staff Meeting Presentation Handout

Question: Are medication errors and near miss events, really such a big problem?
Answer: Yes. Here are a few facts:
1. The human and financial costs of these errors are astronomical; estimated direct
costs are approximately $21 billion, indirect costs exceed $75 billion and account for
approximately 7000 lives lost annually.
2. At least 1.5 million preventable medication errors and adverse drug events occur
each year in the United States, excluding errors of omission.
3. Not all medication errors are detected and not all detected errors are reported; they
are underestimated and generally under-reported by an estimated 90%
4. It is estimated that on average, the hospitalized patient will be exposed to a
minimum of one medication error each day they are hospitalized.
5. It is estimated that for every detected medication error, there are approximately
100 errors that go undetected daily as a result of the sheer volume of medications
being prescribed, dispensed, and administered in the hospital.
6. The severity of harm for patients experiencing a medication error is low; greater
than 90% of all medication errors result is no or low harm, with only 10%
contributing to serious patient harm.
7. One study found that 36% of errors resulted in slightly increased monitoring, 31%
of errors did not result in patient harm, and 26% of the errors did not actually reach
the patient.
8. Approximately 50% of nurses are reticent about reporting medication errors
because they fear disciplinary action.
9. One third of all medication errors occur during the administration phase of
medication delivery; making nurses well positioned to recognize near miss events
and prevent medication errors.
Question: As a nurse, can I really make a difference:
Answer: Yes.
1. Nurses have an obligation to look for risks, report errors or hazards, and help design
safer systems.
2. Recognizing conditions contributing to errors is critical so that a safer patient care
environment can be created.
3. By reporting medication errors (actual and near miss), the system or work
environment in which nurses administer medications can be improved.
4. “If we truly want safer care we will have to design safer care systems” (Berwick and
Leape)
5. “We cannot change the human condition, but we can change the conditions under
which humans work” (Reason)
6. Emphasis on ‘what’ went wrong, not ‘who’ is at fault is critical
7. The standard of practice in medicine and nursing is perfection, however healthcare
professionals acknowledge that mistakes are inevitable and most want to learn from
the mistakes in an understanding and supportive environment.
Barbara Durham, MSN, RN, CNE, DNP-c
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Appendix Q: Review of articles about medication safety education programs, scope of the problem/contributing factors and
costs of medication errors:
Article

Background

Medication safety education programs:
Sears, K., Goldsworthy,
Could simulation help
S., & Goodman, W.M.
reduce med errors; had
(2010). The relationship
hard time finding clinical
between simulation in
placements; are
nursing education and
knowledge and skills
medication safety.
learned in simulation
Journal of Nursing
transferable to clinical?
Education, 49, 1.pp 52-55
DOI:10.3928/0148483420090918-12

Lu, M.C., Yu, S., Chen,
I.J., Wang, K.K., Wu,
H.F., & Tang, F.I. (2013).
Nurses’ knowledge on
high-alert medications: A
randomized control trial.
Nurse Education Today,
33, 24-30. doi:
10.1016/j.nedt.2011.11.01
8.
Dennison, R. D. (2007). A
medication safety
education program to
reduce the risk of harm

Explores the effectiveness
of an educational
intervention on nurses’
knowledge about highalert medications

Research Methods and
Strength of Evidence

Results

Implications

RCT using volunteers,
posttest only design; 3
treatment groups, 3
intervention groups;
54 participants

Fewer errors reported in
the Sim Educ int group
Lack of knowledge,

Simulation based
education
intervention.

Pre-test average: 75.8%
(no diff in control and
intervention groups)
100% response rate in
control; 94% in
intervention group
Post-test average: 94.7%
with paired T-test=10.82
and p<0.0001

PPT is an effective
method for providing
education in this
group.

The Climate of Safety
Survey was administered
before and after
participants completed the

Medication safety
education program
was developed to
reduce harm caused

Poisson distribution
P<0.05
Strength of Evidence:
Experimental, randomly
assigned
Level 1; High Quality
21 wards; 232 nurses,
control and intervention
group (60 min educ
intervention – PPT) with
pre and post test after 6
wks

Taiwan

Medication errors are
under reported and under
detected. Many nurses are
unsure about what exactly

Strength of Evidence:
Literature review
Level 1; High Quality
Participants were required
to complete two 30 min
computer modules on
medication safety:
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Article

Background

caused by medication
errors. The Journal of
Continuing Education in
Nursing, 38, 4, 176-184.
DOI: 10.1111/j.13652834.2009.00995.x

constitutes a medication
error.

Research Methods and
Strength of Evidence
Focused on high alert IV
meds,
Analysis of reports from
the US Pharmacopeia
MEDMARX reporting
system
Strength of Evidence:
Quasi Experimental
Pre/Post Test
Level 2; Good Quality

Currie, L. M., Desjardins,
K. S., Levine, E., Stone,
P. W., Schnall, R., Li, J.,
& Bakken, S. (2009).
Web-based hazard and
near miss reporting as part
of a patient safety
curriculum. Journal of
Nursing Education, 48,
13, 669-677.
doi:10.3928/0148483420091113-03

Web-based reporting
system for postbaccalaureate students;
incorporate patient safety
concepts during formative
nursing educ

Quantitative data
collected on two
questions:
“On your shift today,
were there any near
misses?”
“On your shift today,
were there any ‘dangerous
situations’ that could
cause a future event?”
Strength of Evidence:
Non-experimental,
prospective, observational
Level 3; High Quality

Results

Implications

Medication Safety
Education Program.
Stat sign change in
knowledge scores, but “no
change in climate of
safety scores, the use of
behaviors advocated in
the medication safety
education program to
improve medication
infusion safety, the
number of infusion pump
alerts, or the number of
reported errors.

by med errors.

453 students made 42552
reports; of the 10206
“yes” reports – 59% were
hazards, 41% were near
misses; of the near misses
48% had a planned
interception and 52% had
unplanned interceptions.
Hazards are more visible
and easier to report;
during 1st and 3rd year,
students reported 2 times
more hazards (p<0.01).

A change in
knowledge does not
produce a change in
practice.
Recommend
education on problem
solving on how to
prevent med errors
Leadership support is
crucial in creating
practice change.
Dimensions of safety
culture
Transform to become
HROs
Patient safety
curriculum included:
modeling,
monitoring, and
mindfulness
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Background

Baker (1997)

Page, K., & McKinney,
A. A. (2007). Addressing
medication errors: The
role of undergraduate
nurse education. Nurse
Education Today, 27,
219-224.
DOI:10.1016/j.nedt.2006.
05.002

Dept of Health reports
similar to IOM reports
prompted a look in to
medical and medication
errors and began an
initiative for “improving
medication safety”

Research Methods and
Strength of Evidence

Results

Implications

Ethnomethodological
study

The author identified 6
ways medication errors
can be categorized: a) if it
is not my fault, it is not an
error; b) if everyone
knows, it is not an error;
c) if you can put it right, it
is not an error; d) if a
patient has needs that are
more urgent than the
accurate administration of
medication, it is not an
error; e) if it is a clerical
error, it is not an error;
and f) if the irregularity
prevents something
worse, it is not an error.
“Imperative that
undergraduate education
should emphasize the
issues of medication
safety”

Clear definitions and
examples of types of
medication errors are
needed so that the
nurse can recognize
that an error has
occurred.

An educational initiative
was therefore introduced
to address this problem. A
Medication Safety Day,
which focused on the
causes of medication
errors, was implemented
to highlight how and why
drug incidents may occur.
Strength of Evidence:
Literature review
Level 5; Good Quality

Med Safety Day with
focus on causes of
med errors, “how and
why”, knowledge of
pharm for junior
doctors
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Article

Background

Research Methods and
Strength of Evidence
Summary of literature

Hughes, R. G. & Blegen,
M.A. (2008). Chapter 37.
Medication administration
safety. In R.G. Hughes
(Ed), Patient safety and
quality: An evidencebased handbook for
nurses. AHRQ
Publication No. 08-0043,
April 2008. Agency for
Healthcare Research and
Quality, Rockville, MD.
Retrieved from
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/
nurseshdbk/
Choo J . , Hutchinson A.
& Bucknall T. (2010).
Nurses' role in medication
safety. Journal of Nursing
Management 18, pp. 853–
861. DOI:
10.1111/j.13652834.2010.01164.x

AHRQ handbook for
patient safety

Safe med admin is
essential to patient safety
Multidisciplinary
approach,
interprofessional
communication

Lit review

Tzeng, H.M., Yin, C.Y.,
Schneider, T.E. (2013).
Medication error-related
issues in nursing practice.
MedSurg Nursing, 22, 1,

Addresses issues related
to medication errors and
strategies to decrease
them
“Errors need to be

Literature review

Strength of Evidence:
Literature review
Level 5; Good Quality

Strength of Evidence:
Literature review
Level 5; Good Quality

Strength of Evidence:
Literature review
Level 5; Good Quality

Results

Implications

Strategies to improve med
admin safety:
Nationwide voluntary
efforts – data is not
reliable or valid
Nurses’ education and
training: MAE are most
likely to be wrong time,
omission, and wrong or
extra dose
System, process and
human factors:
technology, distractions,
and knowledge/math
skills
Measures to prevent med
errors: Establish med
safety policies, increase
nurse competence in
medication
administration, create safe
environments for med
admin, learn from other
industries (aviation),
harness information tech

Culture of safety
Increase staff levels
Improve system
factors (new
technology)
Include continuing
education on
medication
pharmacokinetics and
math

Adopt safety
measures similar to
aviation
Nurses have a role in
system redesign
Focus on the
accountability of the
organization, not the
individual
Embrace system
factors
Education: patient safety
Use case-based
mg’t in schools and on the scenarios and
job training (i.e. RCA),
simulation based
identify knowledge and
scenarios with
skill deficiencies to
specific clinical
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Article

Background

Research Methods and
Strength of Evidence

13-16.

appreciated, understood,
and corrected
immediately”

Leufer, T. & ClearyHoldforth, J. (2013). Let’s
do no harm: Medication
errors in nursing: Part 1.
Nurse Education in
Practice, 13, 213-216.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.nepr.2013.01.013.

Determine the extent and
severity of the problem of
medication errors and
contributing factors

Literature review

Cleary-Holdforth, J. &
Leufer, T. (2013). The
strategic role of education
in the prevention of
medication errors in
nursing: Part 2. Nurse
Education in Practice, 13,
217-220.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.nepr.2013.01.012.

Identify the role of
education to prepare
nurses for safe medication
management and reduce
med errors

Literature review

Strength of Evidence:
Literature review
Level 5; Good Quality

Strength of Evidence:
Literature review
Level 5; Good Quality

Results

Implications

address cognitive errors

examples to
encourage learning
and teach clinical
reasoning
Competence is a
dynamic process and
a continuum
Identify system
issues
Focus on
fundamentals to
ensure the highest
level of safety

Complex process:
(prescription, calculation,
constitution, checking,
administration, pt
assessment,
documentation, pt med
educ)
Extrinsic problems:
workload, staffing ratio,
skill mix, # of pt’s, pt
acuity
Intrinsic: knowledge
deficit, practice deficit,
math skills, inattention/
distraction, transcription
error, and disorganized
pyxis.
Minimum of 10% error
rate on drug calculations,
poor math skills (in one
study 35% scored > 70%).
Educate patient/family to
not distract nurses during
med admin.
Onus is on nurse to
enforce no interruptions

Tailored education
program helps to
increase competence
in med mg’t and
pharmacology and
thus decrease
medication errors
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Background

Scope of the problem and contributing factors:
Wolf, Z. R., Hicks, R.,
Examine characteristics of
Serembus, J. F. (2006).
medication errors made
Characteristics of
by nursing students
medication errors made
by students during the
administration phase: A
descriptive study. Journal
of Professional Nursing,
22, (1), 39-51.
doi:10.1016/j.profnurs.20
05.12.008
Kazaoka, T., Ohtsuka, K., Communication problems
Ueno, K., & Mori, M.
in team nursing systems;
(2007). Why nurses make Simulation involved a
medication errors: A
nurse giving a medication
simulation study. Nurse
prepared by another nurse
Education Today, 27,
312-317.
DOI:10.1016/j.nedt.2006.
05.011
Harding, L. and Petrick,
T. (2008). Nursing student
medication errors: A
retrospective review.
Journal of Nursing
Education, 47 (1), 43-47.

Research Methods and
Strength of Evidence

Results

Implications

examined characteristics
of med errors made by
nursing students using
MEDMARX database

Performance deficit
Inexperience and
distractions

Student med errors
may be more
frequent than
thought; faculty must
consider curriculum
revisions
incorporating
medication use safety

Strength of Evidence:
Descriptive, retrospective,
secondary analysis
Level 3; Good Quality

Simulation study

Strength of Evidence:
Non-experimental
Level 3; Good Quality

Retrospective review of
med errors by nsg
students
Strength of Evidence:
Non-experimental
Level 3; Good Quality

Errors of omission and
wrong dose

Must fully communicate
pt symptoms and need for
med;
Frequent interruptions
were recognized as an
environmental factor

Rights violations
System factors
Knowledge and
understanding

This study was done
in Japan using team
nursing system and is
not fully applicable
to the USA. One
nurse must request
another nurse to
administer
medications.
Teaching strategies
need to account for
the complexity of
med admin process
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Research Methods and
Strength of Evidence
Wahr, J.A., Shore, A.D.,
Compare the
Strength of Evidence:
Harris, L.H., Rogers, P,
characteristics of
Non-experimental,
Panesar, S, Matthew, L.,
medication errors reported retrospective, cross… & Pham, J.C. (2014).
to MedMarx and NRLS in sectional
Comparison of intensive
the US and UK.
Level 3; High Quality
care unit medication
Were there substantial
errors reported to the
differences?
Severity scales were
United States’ MedMarx
collapse to conform (for
and the United Kingdom’s
categorizing).
National Reporting and
Learning System (NRLS):
n=2,837 UK errors
A cross-sectional study.
n=56,368 US errors
American Journal of
Medical Quality, 29 (1),
61-69. doi:
10.1177/10628606134829
64

Westbrook, J. I., Rob, M.
I., Woods, A., & Parry, D.
(2011). Errors in the
administration of
intravenous medications
in hospital and the role of
correct procedures and
nurse experience. British
Medical Journal Quality
and Safety, 20, 10271034. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-

Background

To measure the frequency,
type and severity of IV
med administration errors
in hospitals
Are there commonalities
between errors? Any
association between nurse
experience or procedural
failures?
Study conducted in
Australia.

Results

Implications

Descriptive results:
Low/no harm >90%
Moderate to severe harm
< 5% of reports
Death < 0.1% of reports
Same high risk
medications: Insulin,
heparin, morphine,
potassium, vancomycin,
furosemide, fentanyl.

Because of the
similarities,
conclusions from
other European
studies are likely
more transferable to
the United States.

Differences: UK vs US
Wrong dose 44% vs 29%
Omitted dose 8.6% vs
27%
Mod to severe harm 4.9%
vs 3.4%
Gentamycin 7.4% vs
0.7%

69.7% of IV med admin
IV meds have higher
had at least 1 clinical error risk associated with
Strength of Evidence:
Non-experimental,
and 25.5% were serious
them and often
prospective, observational
produce more serious
Level 3; Good Quality
Wrong IV rate, mixture,
consequences.
volume, and drug
n=107 nurses
compatibility accounted
Most errors were
n=568 IV meds
for 91.7% of errors.
attributed to skill and
n=6 wards in two teaching IV bolus was associated
knowledge
hospitals
with 312% inc risk of
deficiencies.
error
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Background

Research Methods and
Strength of Evidence

2011-000089

Flynn, L., Liang, Y.,
Dickson, G. L., Xie, M.,
& Suh, D.-C. (2012).
Nurses’ practice
environments, error
interception practices, and
inpatient medication
errors. Journal of Nursing
Scholarship, 44, 2, 180186. doi:10.1111/j.15475069.2012.01443.x

Determine relationships
among characteristics of
the nurse practice
environment, staffing
levels, error interception
practices, rates of nonintercepted med errors

Strength of Evidence:
Non-experimental
Level 3; Good Quality

Reid-Searl, K., Moxhan,
L., & Happell, B. (2010).
Enhancing patient safety:
The importance of direct
supervision for avoiding
medication errors and
near misses by
undergraduate nursing
students. International

Focus of this study was to
examine the extent to
which nursing students
might contribute to
medication errors and the
factors that influence the
practice of medication
administration for
students.

Strength of Evidence:
Qualitative, Grounded
theory, semi-structured
interviews were
audiotaped using open
ended questions
Level 3; High Quality

82 Med/Surg units from
14 US hospitals
Data collected over 8
months
n=686 staff nurses

n=28 nursing students

Results
Error rates and
seriousness decreased
with more nursing
experience. Each year of
experience (up to 6 years)
decreased risk of error by
10.9% and serious error
by 18.5%.
Nurses should have more
frequent engagement in
interception practices to
reduce medication errors:
1. check MAR with MD
order; 2. determine
rational for order/med; 3.
request MDs to rewrite
improper orders; 4. ensure
the patient/family are
knowledgeable and
encourage them to
question variances in
practice
9/28 students reported
making a medication error
or near miss that was
dependent on the level of
supervision provided at
the time of the incident.
Lack of supervision,
distractions, reactions

Implications

Supportive practice
environments
increase quality
nursing practices.

Proper supervision is
critical to intercept
medication errors
made by student
nurses (establish a
policy, provide
training)
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Article

Background

Journal of Nursing
Practice, 16, 225-232.
doi:10.1111/j.1440172X.2010.01820.x

The aim was to build
theory, not to test one.
Study was conducted in
Australia.

Karavasiliadou, S. &
Athanasakis, E. (2014).
An inside look into the
factors contributing to
medication errors in the
clinical nursing practice.
Health Science Journal, 8,
1, 32-44.

Research Methods and
Strength of Evidence

Results

from supervising nurses
had an impact on the
student’s learning
experience (some nurses
did not want to complete
an incident report, while
others followed the
protocols)
Aim was to review current Strength of Evidence:
Summary of nurse
literature related to the
Systematic review
factors:
individual and the
Level 4; Good Quality
Miscommunication,
organizational factors that Inclusion criteria: English, misreading labels, wrong
contribute to the
published between 1990dose calculation, not
occurrence of medication 2012.
following 5 rights,
errors.
personal neglect (i.e.
fatigue), amount of
clinical experience,
problem with MD orders,
difficulty/lack of
knowledge about infusion
devices
Summary of
organizational factors:
Events on the unit,
distraction, heavy
workload, high
nurse/patient ratios, new
staff, medication related
topics (i.s. labeling,
packaging )

Implications

Focus on prevention
and prompt detection,
culture of safety.
Education methods:
lecture, simulation,
projects, case studies
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Background

Kiekkas, P., Karga, M.,
Lemonidou, C., Aretha,
D., & Karanikolas, M.
(2011). Medication errors
in critically ill adults: A
review of direct
observation evidence.
American Association of
Critical-Care Nurses, 20,
1, 36-44.
doi10.4037/ajcc2011331

Review of direct
observational evidence
related to IV medication
administration because
these drugs are of highest
risk.
ICU environment.

Saintsing, D., Gibson, L.
M. & Pennington, A. W.
(2011). The novice nurse
and clinical decisionmaking: How to avoid
errors. Journal of Nursing
Management, 19, 354359. DOI:
10.1111/j.13652834.2011.01248.x

Novice nurses (<1 yr
experience) have a higher
risk of making medication
errors and need to
recognize potential
mistakes

Research Methods and
Strength of Evidence
Strength of Evidence:
Systematic review – 6
studies met the inclusion
criteria
Level 4; Good Quality

Results

Implications

Patterns and
characteristics of
medication errors help to
guide prevention
strategies.

Medication errors
reveal weakness in
the care process.
Detection of
medication errors
provides insights into
unsafe practices and
identify systems
factors

Opportunities for errors:
Nurse – patient ratio,
personnel experience,
types of drugs involved in
the errors

Literature review
Found: This review
examined three themes
identified within
the literature including
types of errors, the cause
of errors and potential
interventions.
Strength of Evidence:
Integrative literature
review
Level 4; Good Quality

Increased monitoring was
the most common
consequence of
medication error.
Med errors
Patient falls
Delays in treatment

Critical thinking and
experience were the
most common
themes; and time
management (with
med errors). Help
novice nurses inc
their awareness of
potential errors;
curriculum changes
to improve clinical
decision- making.
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Background

Brady A.-M., Malone A.M. & Fleming S. (2009).
A literature review of the
individual and systems
factors that contribute to
medication errors in
nursing practice. Journal
of Nursing Management
17, pp. 679–697

Med errors are a
significant cause of
M&M. An imperative to
reduce med errors to
deliver safe care.

Benner, P., Sheets, V.,
Uris, P., Malloch, K.,
Schwed, K., & Jamison,
D. (2002). Individual
practice, and system
causes of errors in
nursing: A taxonomy.
Journal of Nursing
Administration, 32, 10,
509-523.
Wolf, Z. R. & Serembus,
J. F. (2004). Medication
errors: Ending the blame
game. Nursing
Management, 35, 8, 4148.

Research Methods and
Strength of Evidence
Lit review: CINAHL,
PubMed, ScienceDirect,
Synergy 1988-2007:
Key words: med errors,
med mgt, med
reconciliation, med
knowledge, math skills,
reporting med errors
Strength of Evidence:
Literature review
Level 5; Good Quality
Purposeful sample of 21
cases involving
competency and clinical
judgment resulting in
actual harm were selected
from 9 state BRNs.

Nursing role as patient
advocate play a key role
in reducing med errors.
The goal of the study was
to develop a taxonomy for
prospective, systematic
error reporting; taxonomy
developed with prevention Strength of Evidence:
in mind
Expert Opinion
Level 5; High Quality
To discover the reactions Open and closed ended
of managers and
question survey, selfpersonnel involved in
report of serious error
reporting errors
Response rate - ~7%

Results

Implications

These include medication
reconciliation, the types of
drug distribution system,
the quality of
prescriptions, and
deviation from procedures
including distractions
during administration,
excessive workloads, and
nurse’s knowledge of
medications.

Establish reporting
mechanisms,
systematic approach
to med recon, clear
definition of what a
medication error is to
increase accuracy of
reporting (to help
establish policy
aimed to reduce med
errors), math
competency,
Identified a “practice
Emphasis on the
responsibility” to learn
importance of
from experience and make reporting and sharing
the learning available to
medication errors that
others to collectively
have been
change practice;
committed.

The most common
disciplinary actions
included: name identified
on incident report 54%,
private verbal reprimand
27%, counseled 25%,
notation on personal
record 11%, referred for
education 5%

Culture of safety
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Cost of medication errors:
Pinella, J., Murillo, C.,
Carrasco, G., & Humet,
C. (2006). Case-control
analysis of the financial
cost of medication errors
in hospitalized patients.
European Journal of
Health Economics, 7, 6671. doi: 10.1007/s10198005-0332-z.
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Background

Research Methods and
Strength of Evidence

Results

Implications

Aim of the study was to
contribute to what is
known about the financial
costs associated with
medication errors.

Strength of Evidence:
Non-experimental,
case/control study,
retrospective analysis
Level 3; Good Quality

Conducted in Spain.

n=172 patient charts were
analyzed produced a total
n=63 cases.

Analysis indicated that
medication errors added
303 days of hospital stay,
overall annual cost of
nearly €76,000.
35% orders are not
validated; 22% were
dispensing errors; 16%
administration errors;
11% due to inattention

Medication errors
have direct
consequences with
the increased
resources used (labs,
drugs, materials, etc).
Indirect costs
included productivity
losses and intangible
costs.

36% required increased
monitoring; 31% no harm;
approx. 26% were near
misses.
Average LOS for cases
was 8.2 days and controls
was 15.13 days
Lahue, B. J., Pyenson, B.
S., Iwaskaki, K., Blumen,
H. E., Forray, S., &
Rothschild, J. M. (2012).
National burden of
preventable adverse drug
events associated with
inpatient injectable
medications: Healthcare
and medical professional
liability costs. American

Study used a healthcare
payer perspective to
analyze the probability of
ADEs and associated
medical costs related to
inpatient injectable
medications, projected
national number of ADEs
and their costs.
Also took a MPL insurer
perspective in analyzing

Strength of Evidence:
Systematic review;
matched cohorts/
compared
Level 4; High Quality
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Background

Health & Drug Benefits,
5, 7. Retrieved from
www.ahdbonline.com.

medication-related facility
and professional insurance
claims to generate a
national MPL costs
related to preventable
ADEs.

Research Methods and
Strength of Evidence

Results

Implications
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Appendix R: Work Breakdown Structure

Medication Safety Education – Work Breakdown
Structure
Streamline
online error
reporting

Create education plan for roll out

Update medication
event dictionaries

Develop content for overview of medication
safety

Send out link

Needs
Assessment

Develop survey
Collect and
analyze data

Medication Safety
Education
Medication
safety learning
module

Develop specific
content

Obtain feedback
from peer review

Develop pre/post
test

Analyze results

Realistic
scenario

Develop clear
objectives

Distribute findings

Revise content as
needed

Pilot tested
Simulation
Exercise

Validated

